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καὶ µὴ ϕοβεῖσθε ἀpiὸ τῶν ἀpiοκτεννόντων τὸ σῶµα,  
τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν µὴ δυναµένων ἀpiοκτεῖναι ·  
ϕοβεῖσθε δὲ µᾶλλον τὸν δυνάµενον  
καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶµα ἀpiολέσαι  
ἐν γεέννῃ. 
 
-ΚΑΤΑ ΜΑΘΘΑΙΟΝ 10:28 
 
 
(And fear not them which kill the body,  
but are not able to kill the soul:  
but rather fear Him which is able  
to destroy both soul and body  
in hell.) 
 
-Matthew 10:28 (KJV) 
iv 
Abstract 
In contemporary metaphysics, there are two popular options for personal numerical 
identity (NID) over time: substance dualism and materialism. According to recent arguments by 
some Christian philosophers, both options conflict with the Christian doctrine of the bodily 
resurrection.  Substance dualism trivializes the physical body for NID (when it has some kind of 
role in the bodily resurrection), and also is seen to conflict with modern neuroscience.  But NID 
and mind cannot be continued solely by the material body, as versions of the Replacement 
Argument (from Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga) show.  There are good aspects to both 
options, especially with regard to the bodily resurrection.  Is there a way to reconcile them? 
In this thesis I have two motivating big questions: 1) Can the conflict between Christian 
substance dualists and materialists be resolved by the hylomorphic Aristotelian model of human 
personhood proposed by Eleonore Stump, based on her interpretation of Thomas Aquinas (the 
Stump/Aquinas model)?  2) Does the Stump/Aquinas model overcome metaphysical challenges 
against numerical identity and the bodily resurrection? I argue that the Stump/Aquinas model 
accommodates the conflict between Christian dualists and materialists by identifying human 
persons with both the physical body and the immaterial mind as a single-substance composite.  If 
we think of the disembodied state as a ‘data backup’ and couple the medieval solutions with 
contemporary terminology, then the Stump/Aquinas model overcomes most of the metaphysical 
challenges it faces.  But, the model ultimately requires a modification to answer the second big 
question.  DNA (as genome or immaterial information) is the configured configurer and part of 
Aquinas’s original concept of the soul as the Aristotelian form of the body. In light of its 
explanatory power and compatibility with Aquinas’ thought, I argue the Stump/Aquinas model,   
modified with DNA, is a strong contender for a robust philosophical-theological anthropology. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
Introduction: Two Big Questions 
 
 
 
Imagine a person, P –we will call him Paul. According to the debate in contemporary 
metaphysics, it seems we have two majority and popular options to account for his personal 
numerical identity. If substance dualism is true, then Paul is two separate substances (a soul/mind 
and a body), and he is numerically identified only with the immaterial aspect of himself (the 
soul/mind). If materialism is true, then Paul is one substance (a physical body made of atoms), 
numerically identified with only his body, and the things historically attributed to the immaterial 
soul (intellect, volition, sensation, memory, personality, consciousness, etc.) are products of his 
neurological and biochemical processes. 
According to recent arguments made by some Christian philosophers, both of the above 
options have problems in the face of the Christian doctrine of the bodily resurrection.1 Under 
substance dualism, the materialists argue, Paul’s physical body is trivial to his resurrection. They 
say dualism is in conflict, since the bodily resurrection assigns at least some sort of role to Paul’s 
body for personal identity. Materialists also say dualism conflicts with everyday experience, 
especially given the scientific advances made in knowledge of the human body and brain. But 
under materialism, the substance dualists argue, Paul’s body cannot be the sole bearer of his 
personal identity, because of the problems related to Ship of Theseus type puzzles for material 
                                                 
   
1
 In this thesis, let the bodily resurrection be such that Paul will be –must be– numerically identical with his pre-
death self; his individual essence (whether in the body or in the soul/mind) must survive his death and must continue 
his personal numerical identity between death and resurrection. Te very nature of the issue in question is centered on 
the problem of personal numerical identity and the bodily resurrection, as a question of philosophical theology. 
2 
objects. Beyond that, the dualists argue it is far from intuitive to say mental content is identical to 
states in the material brain –and mental content should not be what personal identity reduces to, 
in the first place.2 It appears both dualists and materialists have the upper hand in regard to 
explaining the bodily resurrection of the dead and continuity over time of numerical personal 
identity! Is this conflict irresolvable or can we mediate between the good points that both dualists 
and materialists make with respect to the resurrection and identity of persons? We are left with a 
quandary, and a stalemate regarding poor Paul’s identity, and our own. Who and what is he? 
What are we? 
 But what if, instead of being numerically identified with only his material body, or only 
his immaterial soul/mind, Paul is identified with both, as a substantial composite?  Instead of the 
two parts being separate substances, what if the union or composite of Paul is a single substance? 
And what if, instead of the form of Paul having nothing to do with his body, Paul’s essence or 
soul in-formed (and en-formed) the material composite –so that what is necessary for Paul’s 
identity could be ‘backed up’ like computer data? It would mean his identity remains constant, 
and his body is not the seat of his identity, but is properly part of his identity. Could it work? 
In this thesis I have two motivating ‘big questions’, the second following from the 
consequences of the first. 1) Can the apparent conflict between Christian substance dualists and 
materialists be resolved by the hylomorphic Aristotelian understanding of human personhood 
proposed by Eleonore Stump, based on her interpretation of Thomas Aquinas (hereafter termed 
the ‘Stump/Aquinas model’)?3 2) Does the Stump/Aquinas model overcome the many 
                                                 
   
2
 These two items, for example, comprise Alvin Plantinga’s two main arguments in “Against Materialism,” Faith 
and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (Jan 2006): 3-32 and “Materialism and Christian Belief,” in Persons: Human and Divine, 
Edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 99-141.  
 
   
3
 See Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism," Faith and 
Philosophy 12, no. 4 (October 1995): 505-31; and Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003). As to the name I am 
assigning: Stump, in Aquinas, 212, admits that Aquinas is some kind of dualist "since he thinks that there is an 
3 
metaphysical challenges surrounding numerical identity and the bodily resurrection (which is at 
the heart of the aforementioned conflict)? I will argue that the Stump/Aquinas model 
accommodates almost all of the conflicts between Christian dualists and materialists, but it 
requires a modification as an answer to the second ‘big question’: DNA as Stump’s ‘configured 
configurer’ rightly viewed as part of Aquinas’s original concept of an in-forming4 esse or soul. In 
light of its explanatory power and compatibility with Aquinas’s thought, I will argue that the 
Stump/Aquinas model, so modified with DNA, is a strong contender for a robust philosophical-
theological anthropology. 
I will introduce the first question by briefly framing in this introduction what dualism 
requires of the Stump/Aquinas model, via Plantinga’s and Swinburne’s versions of the 
Replacement Argument. This will lead to the topic of chapter two: the Stump/Aquinas model, 
sectioned into succinct statements that are readily found among the defenders of the model. 
Among them: Aristotle’s four causes at the forefront in order to think within Aquinas’s 
metaphysical context about the soul (the most important of the four causes being formal cause); 
Boethius’s definition of a person, “an individual substance with a rational nature,” to show that 
                                                                                                                                                             
immaterial and subsistent constituent of the subject of cognitive function." In “Non-Cartesian,” 520, Stump coins 
“subsistence dualism,” which is certainly an option, though it fails to capture the hard distinction between Aquinas's 
view and Descartes'. Regarding the careful way Stump and Aquinas deal with the intellective aspect of a person, 
‘emergence’ fits to an extent (and Stump has a brief discussion of ‘substance’ as an emergent thing in Aquinas 
Chapters 1 and 6). However, the different shade of meaning for ‘emergent’ in William Hasker’s context rules it out. 
‘Hylomorphism’ is an option, but because Aquinas is not considered a thoroughgoing hylomorphist, and he modifies 
Aristotle’s metaphysics heavily, it does not seem to work, either. ‘Composite dualism’ or ‘compound dualism’ may 
fit, and both have been used recently in the literature –and rightly so: the view can be properly classified as dualism 
to the extent that Aquinas holds to a disembodied state distinct from Plato’s or Descartes’. However, to be safe, I am 
calling it the ‘Stump/Aquinas model’, to go more along the lines of Hud Hudson’s coining, “whatever it is that 
Aquinas is.” Hud Hudson, “I Am Not An Animal!” in Persons: Human and Divine, Edited by Peter van Inwagen 
and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 220-21. 
 
   
4
 Throughout the thesis, I will be borrowing this nuanced understanding of “inform” or “information” and 
emphasizing the double-meaning by hyphenating the term where necessary. Although I can attest that I came upon 
this novel way of using words entirely independent of my reading, for what seems to be the original usage of that 
turn of phrase, see Marjorie Grene, “Aristotle and Modern Biology,” Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 33, no. 3, 
Festrschrift for Philip P. Wiemer (Jul-Sep 1972): 412, where she says, “Thus in the code case or in physiological 
explanation, the problem-location, the description and the explanation all refer to form: information.” 
4 
immaterial minds expressed in a material composite reflects the metaphysically amphibious 
nature of human beings; the soul as configured configurer, unique as the only kind of form that 
survives and subsists from the matter it in-forms; and the criteria for what a ‘substance’ is for 
Stump/Aquinas, to show the separate soul is not a substance by itself, and thus distinguishing the 
model from substance dualism. This will all go toward answering the first ‘big question.’ 
Then, in chapter three, I will argue the Stump/Aquinas model answers Plantinga in the 
affirmative, “Does Paul exist when his body does not?” by way of (C ≠ ID): For Paul’s 
numerical identity, disembodied and resurrected, Constitution is not Identity. I will introduce the 
‘data backup’ analogy (via John Polkinghorne’s information-bearing pattern) to give more clarity 
to the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state. Ambiguities many identify concerning Stump/Aquinas 
and the intellect or mind can be resolved with (D ≠ ID): Relating between the brain and mental 
states, Dependence is Not Identity. With brain localization as a potential weak spot, I will show 
that Stump/Aquinas can –with D ≠ ID and a conception of the mind ‘backed up’ along with the 
configured configurer– include the findings of modern neuroscience (and therefore the 
materialists’ big reason for holding their view). However, even with the two above axioms, there 
are resulting metaphysical challenges concerning the ambiguity of ‘form’ and the resulting 
problem of numerical identity (NID) for the bodily resurrection. It will seem, as a result, that the 
Stump/Aquinas soul must be understood as a µορϕη part and a νους part in one unqualified soul. 
This will result in a conflict that makes it necessary to modify Stump/Aquinas. 
So, in chapter four I will introduce a modification to the model: the immaterial 
information, or genome, of Paul’s DNA is the ‘configured configurer’. I will argue why DNA 
needs to be included within the model, how it accommodates many other problems, and how 
objections to it may be overcome. I show Paul’s numerical identity cannot be merely his DNA, 
5 
because of the problems arising with his identical twin Raul. This means splitting the rational 
soul between DNA as ‘configured configurer’, and the traditional understanding of the 
psychological self that survives death (what I will call, strictly for the purposes of this thesis, the 
Seele-νους), both ‘backed up’ as immaterial information. So I will show Paul’s teleological in-
form-ation, as both DNA and Seele-νους, is sufficient for a solution to the problem of personal 
numerical identity for the resurrection. Finally, in chapter five, I will address any remaining 
objections or logical loose ends and then show step-by-step what Paul’s resurrection entails 
under the Stump/Aquinas model. Throughout, I hope to defend the concept of ‘soul’ while also 
upholding the importance of the physical body, in order to navigate the treacherous waters of 
identity of persons, toward a more coherent Christian metaphysic of the bodily resurrection. 
 
The Requirement from Dualism: the Replacement Argument 
Before I can present the case for the Stump/Aquinas model, I must call brief attention to 
the arguments presented in favor of dualism/immaterialism by Swinburne and Plantinga, in order 
to determine what seems irrefutable and necessary. Substance dualism has been an accepted view 
of metaphysical personhood within classical Christianity, and is perhaps the current majority 
view. It is also a notable philosophical view, with Plato and Descartes commonly seen as its most 
famous defenders. Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne share one argument (among others) 
for substance dualism upon similar merits as the historical iteration: an argument based upon a 
thought experiment dealing with the replacement of Plantinga’s body parts, or brain, while he 
retains his identity, the Replacement Argument. This argument serves as a potential stumbling 
block for anyone arguing for personal identity linked solely to the material body. It therefore sets 
up some requirements that the Stump/Aquinas model must fulfill.  
6 
Swinburne’s statement and defense of it is a recent well-known version, and he notably 
defends dualism within contemporary analytic philosophy. Because he denies any triviality of 
the physical body, Swinburne considers his position to be more like “soft dualism.”5 He still 
centers the compelling call for dualism on the intuition that there is “more to me than the matter 
of which my body and brain are made, a further essential non-physical part whose continuing 
existence makes the brain (and so body) to which it is connected my brain (and body) and to this 
something I give the traditional name of ‘soul’.”6 Soul, for Swinburne, is “pure mental 
substance,”7 and the understanding of the existence of this substance comes as a result of 
considering Swinburne’s version of the Replacement problem, the Brain State Transfer thought 
experiement (BST). It starts with the brain, since it seems right that Paul’s identity would 
continue if he lost his arm or foot, but the brain is a special consideration.8 So, the thought 
experiment of Paul having both hemispheres of his brain removed and implanted into two 
separate bodies poses a problem: which one is Paul? Whereas in Bernard Williams’s famous 
“mad surgeon dilemma,” Paul would be forced to choose which of his ‘selves’ survives or dies, 
Swinburne points out some intangible qualities of personal identity –namely, free will and self 
realization–that seem absurd to think of continuing in part. If Paul can continue with some other 
matter (a different body, perhaps), then Paul’s matter is not essential to his personal identity at 
all, and so no matter is essential to Paul.9 Furthermore, it seems if Paul were to consciously 
experience and remember within one body/brain on even days, and then swap his memory, 
                                                 
   
5
 Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of The Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 10. 
 
   
6
 Richard Swinburne, Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 198. 
 
   
7
 Ibid, 199. 
 
   
8
 Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, 147ff. 
 
   
9
 Ibid, 153; Existence of God, 197-98. 
7 
consciousness and character (without a physical brain transplant) to another body on odd days, 
the material body would have little to do at all with Paul’s personal identity.10 This is why, when 
it comes to identity of human persons, Swinburne favors a shift from a strict Aristotelian account 
of material identity toward a modified account –where what constitutes personal identity is 
indivisible and simple, and not based upon its materials.11 He thinks classical substance dualism 
more simply expresses this view, rather than Aquinas’s modifying Aristotle’s soft materialism. 
Alvin Plantinga has recently argued strongly for dualism, with the explicit claim, 
“Materialism goes contrary to the Christian tradition; even worse (so I’ll argue), it is false. As I 
see it, therefore, Christian philosophers ought to be dualists …Finally, certain crucial Christian 
doctrines (for example, Incarnation and the resurrection of the dead) fit better –much better, I’d 
say—with dualism than with materialism.”12 Plantinga’s conviction rests upon his versions of the 
Replacement argument, all iterations of which require the statement, ”It is possible that: the cells 
in B are replaced by other cells and the originals instantly annihilated while I continue to exist; 
and the replacement time for B and those cells is shorter than the assimilation time.”13 The 
strategy parallels Swinburne’s: show how personal identity is not at all contingent upon the 
physical body. Plantinga has two versions of the argument: the macroscopic and microscopic. 
The macroscopic argument shows the logical possibility for all parts of Paul’s body (B) to be 
replaced, and the original parts annihilated, over a time as short as a microsecond. Thus, B would 
no longer exist, but Paul would. This is even true of the brain, which Plantinga says could have 
                                                 
   
10
 Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, 166. 
 
   
11
 Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 29-33; and The 
Evolution of the Soul, 154, called the “quasi-Aristotelian assumption.” 
 
   
12
 Plantinga, “Materialism and Christian Belief,” 99-100.  
 
   
13
 Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” 6. Also on p. 4, “It seems possible that I continue to exist when B, my body, 
does not. I therefore have the property possibly exists when B does not. B, however, clearly lacks that property.” 
8 
its contents transferred from one hemisphere to another, and the brain could be replaced by all-
new material, one hemisphere at a time.14 In the microscopic argument, Plantinga argues for the 
logical possibility of Paul’s body being replaced at the level of atoms, molecules, or cells. This 
would again be in a very brief amount of time, all while Paul remains conscious.15 The 
microscopic version is, save for the brief amount of time posited for the replacement to take 
place, actually more true to life: all of the matter composing Paul’s body is cyclically replaced 
every few years (and the matter composing the brain is actually replaced every two months).16 
So, from pure logical possibility, it seems right to say Paul continues to exist over the brief time 
it takes to replace the parts of B –even his brain hemispheres– either by chunks or by tiny bits. If 
this holds, it would mean Paul’s personal identity is not his body, so Paul is not his body.  
So, the requirement given to Stump/Aquinas from substance dualism is plain: Paul cannot 
be numerically identified with solely his material body. But due to the bodily resurrection, the 
physical body has at least some role in personal identity. This tension means, at least, keeping in 
mind the conclusions of Swinburne’s BST thought experiments and Plantinga’s Replacement 
Arguments. While holding this tension, we must show: 1) how the Stump/Aquinas model is still 
distinct from substance dualism; 2) how Paul’s soul is numerically identical to him when it is 
disembodied; 3) how substantial form (the soul) can be responsible for mental states and 
configuring matter in the Aristotelian sense. With the unique way the Stump/Aquinas model 
accounts for metaphysical categories, information, material constitution and mind, I will argue in 
the next three chapters that the DNA-modified Stump/Aquinas model is compatible with this 
requirement from dualism while still meeting almost all of the other challenges it faces. 
                                                 
   
14
 Ibid, 4- 5. 
 
   
15
 Ibid, 5-6. 
 
   
16
 Plantinga, “Materialism and Christian Belief,” 104. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
Ancient and Medieval Background: The Stump/Aquinas Model 
 
 
 
 At resurrection, our subject, Paul, is in the middle of the dualist-materialist conflict. 
Given the various iterations of the Replacement Argument (RA), Paul’s numerical identity 
cannot be comprised simply of his material body. But, given the bodily resurrection, Paul should 
be somehow identified with his material body, since upon being resurrected Paul will be a body 
again, and it is promised to be quite like his old one, to say the least. The Stump/Aquinas model, 
with Paul as an in-formed material composite, bridges the conflict over the resurrection between 
dualists and materialists. Admittedly, the goal of a golden mean between them (or a strategy to 
incorporate the good parts from both), is an elusive prize, and therefore a popular target. What 
makes the Stump/Aquinas model an attractive possibility is its resilience against a traditional 
label, mainly due to its flexibility to incorporate truths from seemingly contradictory views. 
Namely: the Stump/Aquinas non-Cartesian dualism is consistent with RA, and consistent with 
observations raised by Christian materialists17 regarding the relation of brain states to mental 
states, and the bodily resurrection. The modification I offer via DNA to meet the challenge of the 
criterion of personal numerical identity can be affirmed consistently only by a composite 
                                                 
   
17
 The most paradigmatic of whom are Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist 
Alternative to the Soul, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006); Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A 
Constitution View, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1990), among others. 
10 
position: dualism or materialism would have to capitulate on important points, and essentially 
take on aspects of the Stump/Aquinas model to support DNA. Here, I am only seeking to show 
how the Stump/Aquinas model could satisfy the conditions for both sides –I do not hope to solve 
the problem outright. Still, getting from A to B –to Ω– will take some background information. 
For our purposes, the most important advocates of the Stump/Aquinas model are 
Eleonore Stump,18 Christina van Dyke,19 and Jason T. Eberl.20 They thoroughly cite and defend 
Aquinas’s position, and each support Stump’s interpretation in order to rise to contemporary 
challenges relying on Aristotelian categories. As I see it, there are six statements of the model, to 
which I will refer: (A) Aristotelian metaphysical causality: soul is hylomorphic form; (B) 
Boethius defines a person: human persons are metaphysical amphibians; (CC) Configured 
configurer of the material composite is Stump’s ‘soul’; (DDD) Descartes’ dualism is denied: 
Human persons are one composite material substance and not two substances; (C ≠ ID) For 
Paul’s disembodied NID, Constitution is not Identity; (D ≠ ID) Between the brain and mental 
states, Dependence is Not Identity. For reference and clarity, I will discuss and define the first 
four statements of the model, and thoroughly cite affirmations of them, in this chapter. For better 
organization, and because of the pack of metaphysical quandaries that accompany them, I will 
save the discussion of the last two statements for the next chapter. Along the way I will offer 
brief exposition, including answers to the requirement from dualism, and answers to other 
objections to the Stump/Aquinas model.
                                                 
   
18
 In “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism”; and Aquinas; and 
“Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul.” in Die menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den 
Dualismus? Edited by Bruno Niederbacher and Edmund Runggaldier (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006), 151-172. 
 
   
19
 In Christina van Dyke, “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-Repeatability: 
Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection,” Religious Studies 43 (2007) 373-94; and “Not Properly a Person: The 
Rational Soul and Thomistic Substance Dualism.” Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 2 (April 2009): 186-204. 
 
   
20
 Mostly in Jason T. Eberl, “Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings,” The Review of Metaphysics 58, no. 2 
(Dec. 2004), 333-365. 
11 
I. (A) Aristotelian metaphysical causality: soul is hylomorphic form 
According to Stump, Aquinas’s metaphysics relies upon Aristotelian categories, and 
therefore his view of soul radically differs from what can be considered a common or Platonic 
view, which Aquinas sums up as a “motor” within the body.21 Many people today still think of 
Paul’s soul, then, as a wispy spirit-form that floats away from him upon his death, much like a 
ghost. Christians who hold this view of the soul will, of course, be influenced by it in their 
understanding of the resurrection. But for Aquinas, this view of the soul is not the case at all: for 
him, and for us here, ‘soul’ is the generic term for a substantial form22 of a living material object. 
In the Stump/Aquinas model, the concept of ‘form’ comes about as a result of Aquinas’s theory 
of things, or that which is a hoc aliquid (as opposed to a res, a word for ‘things’ more related to 
his ontology or theory of what there is).23 Some hoc aliquids are material, and some are not, like 
angels. Each material thing has a form that configures matter. Form is the actuality of a hoc 
aliquid, and configuration/organization is necessary for existence.24 
For the Stump/Aquinas concept of ‘form’, it is helpful to recall some basic information in 
Aristotle’s four causes (αἰτίαι τέτταρες)25: material cause (ὕλη), the stuff of which a substance 
                                                 
   
21
 See Stump, “Non-Cartesian,” 506-7, and Summa theologiae (ST) Ia.76.a1, a3, a6, and a8. 
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 Stump, “Non-Cartesian,” 511. A ‘substantial form’ is “form in virtue of which a material composite is a member 
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‘accidental form’ in the same way that substance as a category of being is distinct from accidental properties. 
Substantial forms configure prime matter only, whereas, for example, artifacts are a conglomeration of parts (each 
configured by substantial forms), and the artifact itself is configured from the top by an accidental form. Stump, 
Aquinas, 42-3. 
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 See van Dyke, “Not Properly a Person,” 191, footnote 26, where ‘hoc aliquid’ is for Aquinas the term for 
Aristotle’s τοδε τι or ‘particular substance’. In Stump, Aquinas, 35 and the footnotes on 481, hoc aliquid can be 
considered either a substance or a part of a substance (as in the case of a dismembered hand). More concerning 
‘substance’ will be presented in statement (DDD), below. 
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 Stump, Aquinas, 37. Here Stump cites De principiis naturae (DPN ) 1 (340). 
 
   
25
 See Aristotle, Physics Book II, Chs. 3-7 (194b 16-195b 30); Metaphysics Book IV, Ch. 2 (1013a 24-1014a 25); 
Generation of Animals Book I, Ch.1 (715a 3-6). 
12 
(οὐσία) is made; efficient cause (ἀρχἠ της κινήσεως), the principle of motion/change/activity in a 
thing; formal cause (µορϕη), the “λογος of the thing’s essence,”26 or better yet, the plan or 
blueprint which configures the thing; and final cause (τελος), the end or purpose of a thing. So, 
Aquinas’s understands Paul’s soul as the Aristotelian µορϕη of his ὕλη body, and they are a 
single composite –thus, hylo-morphism27 (ὕλη and µορϕη). A thing’s µορϕη in-forms it into the 
thing it is. Aristotle provides a statement of the four causes’ relationship to man:  
What is the material cause of a man? The menses. What is the moving cause? The 
semen. What is the formal cause? The essence. What is the final cause? The end. (But 
perhaps both the latter are the same.) We must, however, state the most proximate 
causes. What is the matter? Not fire or earth, but the matter proper to man.28 
 
Aristotle provides this short anthropological statement more as an example to ask about the 
biological formation of a person (thus the semen as the efficient cause, when obviously there are 
other causes that explain motion in a living, functioning grown human being). The ideas may 
seem odd at first, but perhaps not. The καταµηνια or “menses” as the material cause is not so far-
fetched considering the Greek understanding of embryonic development. As the formal cause, he 
uses the term ‘το τι εν ειναι’ to describe ‘essence,’ which Aquinas analogously takes to be the 
Latin esse. In that vein, Aristotle’s idea of the soul as a formal cause in-forming a composite is 
crucial to understanding Aquinas’s ‘soul.’ The Greek ideas were carried over in Aquinas’s 
reading of the text, and are therefore important in uncovering these vital categories. 
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Thus, following Aristotle’s breakdown in De Anima (II.4 through III.6), for Aquinas, 
every animate or living thing has a soul, “the first principle of life in things that live among us.”29 
Stump points out the Latin word for soul (anima) is Aquinas’s generic term for the substantial 
form of any living material object, and the human soul “is the substantial form constituting the 
material substance that a human being is, and it configured matter, as material forms do.”30 So 
plants have a nutritive soul, and animals a nutritive/sensitive soul, both kinds of which go out of 
existence at death. But human souls are a unity of the nutritive/sensitive/rational. So, we are not 
referring to three separate forms or souls, but rather one soul fulfilling all three roles. For the 
Stump/Aquinas model, then, the human soul is responsible for: 1) the essence of a human being; 
2) the actualization of matter composing it; and 3) the unity of existence and activity in it.31 
These broad categories will be focused below, especially in statements (DDD) and (C ≠ ID), but 
this suffices to lay a foundation for the hylomorphic view. 
As Swinburne understands it, Aquinas takes Aristotle’s oft-cited maxim “the soul is the 
form of the body” and modifies it to proclaim the human soul is the only form able to exist apart 
from its matter. That form, though, is only capable of informing the unique body (or brain) for 
the expression of a particular human soul.32 So, souls for Swinburne are not only different in 
rational/epistemic structure, but should be different in “soul-stuff,” a category unrecognized by 
Aquinas.33 In broader terms, Swinburne argues that because persons are substances, and because 
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 ST Ia. 75.1, as cited in Stump, Aquinas, 15. 
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 Stump, Aquinas, 201. 
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 Eberl, “Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings,” 335; Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) II.68.3-12; Thomas 
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 QDA un.9 as cited in Stump, Aquinas, 193. 
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 Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, 297.  
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they cannot be reduced to their Replacement-prone material stuff, they must be made of 
immaterial stuff, which is indivisible, which is the soul.34 He therefore says Aquinas’s system 
elaborately modifies Aristotle’s ‘form’. Classical dualism does something just as sweeping in 
positing immaterial substance as a second kind, and is not tied to keeping neat the connections to 
Aristotle’s system. Swinburne prefers classical dualism –though even he sees benefits in 
Aquinas, “for example, it enables him to bring out the naturalness of a person being embodied 
and the temporary and transitory character of any disembodiment.”35 But, while his observations 
are accurate, it seems Swinburne’s argument against Aquinas’s Aristotelian framework on forms 
and hoc aliquids is rather ad hoc. If we can demonstrate that modifying Aristotle is more cogent 
in some ways than Swinburne’s preference for classical dualism (if, for example, Stump/Aquinas 
can accommodate DNA in a way Swinburne’s cannot), then so much the better for Aquinas.36 It 
may be he felt he said everything necessary concerning Aquinas’s view in Personal Identity, and 
various places in The Evolution of the Soul. But if that is the case, we are left only with a 
preference for distinct kinds of stuff instead of formal causes, for practicality’s sake. 
Swinburne’s reservations about Aquinas’s model are well-noted, but are minor caveats against 
relying upon Aquinas’s Aristotelian ways and means, rather than defeaters. 
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II. (B) Boethius’s definition of person: human persons are metaphysical amphibians 
 
The defenders of the Stump/Aquinas model show Aquinas consistently holds to 
Boethius’s definition of a person, “an individual substance with a rational nature.”37 (A ‘nature’ 
is just a collection of species-specific properties.) This definition upholds the existence of 
spiritual beings like angels (which are substantial forms not configuring matter), and God, who is 
pure form.38 Given this definition of a person, the definition of a human person becomes a bit 
more complex: Aquinas says, “the word ‘person’ denotes ‘this flesh and these bones and this 
soul, which are the principles that individuate a human being, and indeed which, although they 
do not belong to the signification of ‘person,’ do belong to the signification of ‘human person’ 
(humanae personae).”39  
This puts human persons of the genus ‘rational animal’ in an odd place. As Stump 
explains, Aquinas’s thought contains an ontological hierarchy. At the top are God and the angels, 
forms not configuring matter (with God as pure act). At the bottom are forms configuring matter 
but unable to subsist apart from the material composites they in-form, like rocks and trees, tables 
and chairs. Human persons are uniquely in the middle of this hierarchy as “metaphysical 
amphibians,”40 whose souls as substantial forms come into existence only with the material 
composite they configure. The human soul is the highest kind of form configuring material 
objects, and the lowest kind of form able to subsist separate from matter. Stump observes, 
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 “Rationlais naturae individual substantia,” Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, Ch. 3. See van Dyke, “Not 
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Individuation and Identity of Human Beings. (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2000). 1. 
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“Consequently, in the ranking of forms, the human soul is located right at the boundary between 
the material and the spiritual.”41 
Human beings have a material nature as rational animals,42 and though the very definition 
of ‘person’ for Aquinas does not entail immateriality, the definition does include it.43 
Furthermore, as Eberl says, “A human being is not merely an aggregate of body and soul. A 
material human body and its substantial form are metaphysically distinct, but neither of them 
alone is a substance.”44 Again, because the configurational form (µορϕη) comes into existence 
only along with its matter (ὕλη) in the body, humanae personae as ‘metaphysical amphibians’ 
are composites. Stump says “[Aquinas] takes the soul to be something essentially immaterial or 
configurational but nonetheless realized in material components.”45 When placed within the 
context of Aristotelian form and Boethius’s definition, Aquinas’s understanding of the soul so far 
is: the soul is the (Aristotelian) form of the body, and a human being is a composite of the two, 
which is material, and therefore a human being as rational animal is an immaterial intellective 
mind expressed by an in-formed material body.46 We are led, then, directly to the next statement 
of the Stump/Aquinas model, the ‘configured configurer.’ 
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III. (CC) Configured configurer of the material composite is Stump’s ‘soul’ 
 
Aquinas views the soul as configured/created directly by God and fused into the matter of 
the body. Because Paul is, like all of us, a “metaphysical amphibian,” his substantial form (soul) 
has a double (backward-and-forward) causal aspect: of God creating it directly as an individual 
thing and also the soul itself configuring or in-form the material composite that makes up Paul, 
just like the substantial form of other particular things or hoc aliquids. As Stump says, “For 
Aquinas, to be is to be configured.”47 A form organizes and configures a thing, including its 
causal relations both dynamic (substantial) and static (accidental).48 Stump’s uniquely 
contributes to Aquinas’s understanding of form, and how it relates to the human being: “Like the 
angels, the human soul is itself configured [by God]; but like the forms of other material things, 
the human soul has the ability to configure matter [of the body]. The human soul, then, is a 
configured configurer.”49 All material objects are what they are in virtue of their substantial 
form. As the substantial form of the human body, the soul in-forms the way the person (the 
material composite) is organized for each particular case. 
  The connection reveals itself the further Stump goes into demonstrating Aquinas’s views 
on form. A macro-level object can be configured on different levels, and she gives the example 
of the CAT/Enhancer-Binding Protein (C/EBP).50 In its active form, the C/EBP molecule is a 
dimer with an alpha helix coil. C/EBP can be gradually reduced in layers of complexity and 
configuration from the configured whole, to dimer subunits, to amino acids making up those 
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subunits, to compounds making the amino acids, to periodic elements making up the compounds, 
to protons within each elemental atom, even down to quarks within the protons, until we get to 
prime matter, which is indivisible, potential and conceptual according to Aquinas. Just as those 
steps of configuration come together to make C/EBP, the soul is “what makes that matter not 
only a human body but in fact this living human body.”51 Whereas C/EBP and other material 
things like rocks and trees only have forms that configure the matter, the substantial form of 
human persons (the soul) is in this in-between state, “metaphysical amphibian”: the soul actively 
configures a substantial composite, uniquely rational among created things. Coupling C/EBP 
with Aquinas’s view of the soul as the configuring form of the matter of all living things, 
‘configured configurer’ becomes a powerful way of explaining the hylomorphic relationship 
between ὕλη and µορϕη in living things, particularly in individual human persons.52 
This means, significantly, the substantial form of human persons as soul is more than just 
a mind or νους. Christina van Dyke says: “The rational soul is not just responsible for abstract 
thought, in other words– it’s also responsible for our toenails growing, our livers filtering toxins 
from our blood, and our hearing the alarm clock go off in the morning. Our bodies cannot 
function in separation from our souls.”53 Paul’s soul, then, literally is a configurational state of 
the materials making up his body, or the organization of the matter he would need to give his 
body its species-specific causal powers.54 His soul, furthermore, is unique to his in-formed 
matter; there is just one substantial form configuring the matter into being the rational animate 
                                                 
   
51
 Ibid, 509. 
 
   
52
 Amid her early discussion of Aristotelian form, Stump cites (in Aquinas, 481, footnote 5) Marjorie Grene 
“Aristotle and Modern Biology,” Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (1972): 395-424. Stump says, “She argues that 
Aristotle’s concept of form is very like the contemporary biological concepts of organization or information.” The 
resulting connections to DNA as configured configurer will become more clear in chapter four, below. 
 
   
53
 van Dyke, “Not Properly a Person,” 190. 
 
   
54
 Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly,” 161. 
19 
material composite of Paul. Paul’s soul begins existence only with its composite, the body –not 
before it.55 Notably, this configurational state is alone not sufficient to qualify as a substance, 
which poses a considerable metaphysical difficulty that needs to be addressed. Eberl says, “As 
configured, a human soul subsists with its own individual set of qualities. However, as a 
configurer, that is, as the substantial form of a material body, a human soul does not subsist with 
a complete specific nature. A soul alone is not identical to a human being, nor has it a complete 
human nature.”56 This, of course, leads to the next statement concerning Descartes’ dualism.  
 
IV. (DDD) Descartes’ dualism is denied: Human persons are one composite material  
substance and not two substances 
 
Aquinas forcefully rejects anything like Cartesian dualism –including Platonic dualism: 
 
Accordingly, Plato and his followers asserted that the intellectual soul is not united to 
the body as form to matter, but only as mover to movable, for Plato said that the soul 
is in the body ‘as a sailor in a ship.’57…But this doctrine seems not to fit the facts. 
For, as a result of contact of power, a thing unqualifiedly one does not arise, as we 
have shown; whereas from the union of soul and body there results a man. On Plato’s 
theory, then, a man is not one unqualifiedly speaking, nor consequently, is he a being 
unqualifiedly speaking, but a being by accident. In order to avoid this, Plato asserted 
[In Alcibades, 129E, 130C] that man is not a being composed of body and soul, but 
that the soul itself using the body is man; just as Peter is not a thing composed of man 
and clothes, but a man using clothes. This, however, is shown to be impossible.58 
 
Stump shows that Aquinas elsewhere, as well, anticipates the Cartesian position, well-known 
from Plato, and rejects it.59  This means for Aquinas –contra substance dualism as commonly 
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held– Paul is not merely a soul; he is not numerically identified with only his soul. Aquinas says, 
“The soul is part of the human species; for this reason, since it is still by nature unitable [to a 
body] even when it is separated, it cannot be the sort of individual substance which is called a 
‘hypostasis’ or ‘first substance’ any more than a hand or any other part of a human being can. 
And so neither the name nor the definition of ‘person’ belongs to the rational soul.”60 Since, 
then, we are not seeking to identify a human person solely with their immaterial aspect, there 
remains a large gap of explanation for the Stump/Aquinas model to fill. Aquinas views the soul 
as the substantial form of the human being (as a matter/form, or body/soul, or ὕλη/µορϕη 
composite); the person is one in-formed material substance and not two. It is on this interpretive 
point where substance dualists, like Plantinga, have disagreed: “There is also the important but 
obscure view of Thomas Aquinas and his followers. Is this a form of dualism? The question is 
vexed. According to Aquinas, a human person is a material substance with an immaterial part, 
the soul. Aquinas says, of this immaterial part, that it is itself a substance.” 61 But Aquinas 
clearly says, “body and soul are not two actually existing substances; rather, the two of them 
together constitute one actually existing substance.”62  Because of the difficultly concerning 
Aquinas’s meaning of ‘substance’ and ‘part’, Paul’s unity as a human person, according to van 
Dyke, “would be seriously undermined if both body and soul were independent substances.”63  
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An extremely important question arises: what exactly does the Stump/Aquinas model 
mean by ‘substance’? Which among the metaphysical things that Aquinas reifies are properly 
called ‘things’? A foundational question of philosophy lurks, “What is being?” which converges 
on the question “What is human being?” In order to deny Descartes’ dualism, we need to get a 
grip on the Stump/Aquinas view of ‘substance’. The task certainly cannot be completed (or the 
surface of it barely scratched) here. Aristotle himself recognized “the question which was raised 
formerly and is raised now and always, and which always causes difficulty, is what being is; and 
this is the question what substance is.”64 It is necessary, though, to nail down a short framework, 
in order to call upon the ideas with some familiarity. 
 Recall from statement (A) that a form (µορϕη) for Aquinas is that which in-forms the 
matter into the composite. A composite is the only sort of thing which is a ‘particular thing’ or 
individual substance or hoc aliquid in the proper sense. For human persons, the soul is the form 
of their material hylomorphic composite. Therefore, the soul (as form) “is precisely the actuality 
whereby the body has life,”65 –it is the act of the body, and the body is only potential with 
respect to the soul, and the compound human being is the thing that is alive.66 For all things, 
Stump points out that each form is the actuality of a hoc aliquid, and its configuration or 
organization by such a form is necessary for its existence.67 A hoc aliquid must be complete in 
being and kind, and so cannot just be either the form or the matter by itself; something must be a 
composite to be considered a hoc aliquid. In other words, matter is potential being, form is 
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‘entelechy’ (i.e. the actuality rendering the matter actual), and a composite of the form and 
matter is the resulting actual thing which is properly a substance.68  
So: ‘substance’ is the “primary kind of being”69 that, according to Aristotle, indicates the 
whatness of a thing (‘whatness in Latin being “quiddity,” as opposed to quantity or quality, 
affection, or other sort of accidental property, which are categories of being but not substance). 
Substance is ‘being’ in an unqualified sense, rather than a special sense; things that are qualities 
or have connection with a substance are not themselves substances.70 Aristotle points out there 
are four things ‘substance’ can be used to denote: 1) essence, or again quiddity/’whatness’; 2) 
universal or abstract thing; 3) a genus (a way of classifying particular things); 4) and a subject, 
that of which the other three are predicated. (A subject, here, is a particular thing, or again a hoc 
aliquid.) It is this fourth use in which we are interested for the Stump/Aquinas model. Substance, 
then, is “not what is predicated of a subject, but that of which all other things are predicated.”71 
Hence, a substance in our sense can be considered the subject, on the receiving end of any 
qualifying (accidental) property. And although the ability to receive accidental properties is not 
itself enough to satisfy a proper definition of ‘substance’, it is a good start.  
Along those lines, Aristotle says two things “belong chiefly to substance” as subject: 1) 
to exist separately, and 2) to be a particular thing. But an individual substance/particular 
thing/hoc aliquid, for Aquinas, is not necessarily something complete in its being and kind. So 
the definition of ‘substance’, over and above ‘particular thing’, ought to be complete without 
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reference to anything else. Aquinas says, “every substance is defined in terms merely of its 
material and formal principles.”72 Stump points out this definition requirement could be a third 
condition for ‘substance’ if it were not for the resulting tricky circularity: i.e. it could be only 
complete things have substantial forms, but the fact that substantial forms are had only by 
substances is only itself by definition.73 Aquinas himself mirrors Aristotle’s two conditions for 
‘substance’ in QDA 1, but makes a qualification to distinguish it from his understanding of hoc 
aliquids: 1) independent existence, and 2) complete in species and genus.74 Though Aquinas 
does refer to the soul as ‘substance’ in a loose, non-technical sense, the soul only meets the first 
criterion, since only composites are complete in species and genus and thus a substance.75  
In regards to the question of how the Stump/Aquinas model is distinct from Cartesian 
dualism, the formal cause (including a human soul) of a thing is not itself a substance, because 
some hoc aliquids can exist on their own, though they are not substances. Stump points out, 
“…at best, for Aquinas, the ability to exist on its own is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for something’s being a substance.”76 So, things like dismembered hands and disembodied souls 
are hoc aliquids, but not substances because they are not complete things in their own right. They 
can be defined only in relation to something else (namely the composite human being, which is a 
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substance).77 Within a substantial form, the elements making up the composite shed their own 
particular substantial forms, and there is only one substantial form for a composite. A material 
substance, then, is prime matter configured by a substantial form, and the constituent things 
within it are parts (without their own substantial forms) of that composite. Stump says it may be 
more helpful to think of ‘substance’ as emergent with respect to parts; the parts lose their own 
forms in constituting the whole. 78 However, we can divide composites into parts, and one 
substance into several substances. Stump examines it like this: 
…although accounts of emergentism are typically couched in terms of emergent 
properties, on Aquinas’s way of thinking about material objects what can emerge 
when form is imposed on matter is not just properties but substances. When 
material components are combined into something higher level with a particular 
configuration, a substance will come into being.79 
 
So how is Stump/Aquinas compatible with, while not identical to, Descartes’ dualism? 
There are, after all, roadblocks along the way. Dean Zimmerman cautions, “Unless there is some 
deep reason to suppose that the real meaning of ‘dualist’ in our mouths does not track our 
considered application to individual cases, belief in immaterial formal causes should not be 
sufficient to make one a dualist.”80 Substance dualists have reason to believe the Stump/Aquinas 
model is not dualistic enough. Materialists, on the other hand, can assert the model is flawed and 
not worth the effort, or is, perhaps, nuanced substance dualism with exotic categories. Peter van 
Inwagen, for example, is incredulous concerning Aquinas’s view, but also incorrect: 
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[Aquinas] teaches that we are some sort of union or amalgam or compound, of a 
material and an immaterial substance; and such a union could not be classified as 
either material or immaterial. But the form the position takes in his work scarcely 
seems coherent. Thomas thinks that I am a union of my soul and my body, the 
former being an immaterial substance and the latter a material substance. So far, 
this is fairly plain sailing.81 
 
But, as we have seen above: 1) Aquinas holds the human composite can be classified, as 
material; and 2) the soul is not immaterial substance or stuff. Again, for Aquinas, the soul is not 
a substance at all –hoc aliquid, yes, but substance, no: “…body and soul are not two actually 
existing substances, but instead one actually existing substance arises from these two.”82 So, it is 
not so fairly plain sailing for van Inwagen, after all. He continues, “But Thomas also thinks that 
the soul is the form of the body. I do not see, and no one has ever been able to explain to me, how 
something that is the form of a substance can also be a substance.”83 But, the soul is not a 
substance (see above), and Aquinas never properly referred to it as such.84 As is plain from 
Stump/Aquinas, the union van Inwagen speaks of is a body in-formed by the substantial or 
configurational form, and is material, without question, though not merely material. 
It seems Zimmerman, who is weary of identifying Aquinas’s view as substance dualism, 
outright conflicts with van Inwagen. Obviously, at most only one can be correct (though both of 
them could be incorrect). Ultimately, Stump/Aquinas does not identify Paul merely with his soul, 
and so the model is, if you will, clear and distinct from Descartes’. For Descartes, the soul and 
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body are separate substances that relate to each other via efficient causation–the model is purely 
a ghost in a machine, or like Plato’s “motor” Aquinas refers to. This is why the Stump/Aquinas 
model is not exactly like substance dualism. We can consider Aquinas’s ‘soul’ to be more like a 
dynamic, active blueprint –a form, relating to matter primarily via formal causation. The soul, for 
Descartes, is only configured, but not a configurer, but for Stump/Aquinas, it is a configured 
configurer, a hoc aliquid; not substance, but it subsists.  
So, from statements (A) through (DDD) of the Stump/Aquinas model, we can at least 
say, so far, that it is different from substance dualism. But there are some large metaphysical 
challenges that still need to be addressed. Does the Stump/Aquinas model answer Plantinga’s 
important question in the affirmative, “Does Paul exist when his body does not?” Yes, in the 
disembodied state, by holding that Constitution is Not Identity (C ≠ ID). Can the ambiguities 
many identify concerning this Stump/Aquinas disembodied state and the immaterial (or perhaps 
material) mind be resolved? Yes, by holding that Dependence is Not Identity (D ≠ ID). In the 
next chapter I will begin by arguing for the merits these two axioms, both in how they allow the 
Stump/Aquinas model to be compatible with substance dualism, and in how they allow the 
model to incorporate the useful elements of the various materialist views. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
A Contemporary Image: Metaphysical Challenges 
 
 
 
 With the previous points of the Stump/Aquinas model as a foundation, there is still a 
dilemma. In order to have a cogent concept of Paul’s bodily resurrection, with personal 
numerical identity (NID) intact between death and eternal life, serious metaphysical challenges 
need to be addressed. The job is made somewhat easier by two axioms to help us on our way: 
Constitution is Not Identity (C ≠ ID) and Dependence is Not Identity (D ≠ ID). The notion of a 
‘data backup’ of Paul’s subsisting soul, or configurational state, could tie it all together. But, 
while promising, the axioms will not prevail against the challenges (particularly specific 
contours of the mind/body problem and vagueness paradoxes) without a modification. 
The challenges are presented by wily and deft interlocutors. Plantinga wants to know if 
Paul still exists when his body does not –if not, his RA still applies. Nancey Murphy thinks brain 
localization studies make Paul’s mind (νους) an entirely material thing (as the brain), and thus 
make the soul an obsolete concept. But the most serious of all is one shared by Peter van 
Inwagen, Lynne Rudder Baker, Dean Zimmerman, Kevin Corcoran, William Hasker, and 
Trenton Merricks, and is due to what Robert Pasnau calls the “mind-soul problem”,85 which will 
become painfully evident. All are skeptical of the Stump/Aquinas form or µορϕη, that it is 
ambiguous at best and spurious at worst. I will term it the ‘µορϕη schmorphe’ objection: how 
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does a configurational state, in-forming the material composite, act as the intellective mind with 
causal and psychological powers? Or vice-versa: how is intellective mind also the configured 
configurer, giving order to the atoms in our bodies? By the end, I argue Stump/Aquinas needs to 
be modified. As a result of the focus these challenges bring, Stump/Aquinas’s soul will be split 
into two parts: one, the µορϕη, or configured configurer, and the other, the νους, or intellect. 
How, then, do we make sense of the split, and what does it mean for the bodily resurrection? 
 
I. (C ≠ ID) For Paul’s disembodied NID, Constitution is not Identity 
 
Plantinga is hesitant to welcome Stump/Aquinas without, first, a question: 
I’ll be arguing that it is possible that I exist when my body doesn’t; is that a 
possibility, on Thomas’s view? True, on his view my soul can exist when my 
body doesn’t, but it also seems, on this view, that I am not identical with my soul. 
Rather, I am a material object that has an immaterial soul as a part. So (on his 
view) can I exist when my body does not? If the answer is no, then Aquinas’s 
view is not felicitously counted as a version of dualism; at least it is not among 
the versions of dualism for which I mean to argue. If, on the other hand, the 
answer is yes, we can welcome Aquinas (perhaps a bit cautiously) into the dualist 
camp.86 
 
According to Stump, Aquinas’s answer to Plantinga’s question, “Can I exist when my body does 
not?” is an unequivocal ‘yes’. It is also the case that Paul is a material object not identical with 
his immaterial soul per se –and Paul’s rational soul is also merely a formal cause (while 
embodied). Stump says, in what works well as a direct reply to Plantinga:  
That constitution is not identity in the case of human beings is clear when it 
comes to integral parts, on either the macroscopic or microscopic level. A human 
being can survive the loss of some of his elemental bits (or molecular 
constituents) or even the loss of some of his larger integral parts, such as a hand. 
But Aquinas thinks the point about constitution and identity holds also for 
metaphysical parts in the special case of a human being, whose substantial form 
can exist on its own.87 
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So, Stump affirms Plantinga’s Replacement Argument (RA) (both macro and microscopic). She 
delicately shows the personhood status of Paul’s disembodied soul by the axiom ‘Constitution is 
not Identity’ (C ≠ ID). Let C ≠ ID be Baker’s original, eloquent definition: “persons are 
constituted by bodies, but are not identical to bodies…the relation between Smith and her body is 
not one of identity.”88 The cliché statement: C ≠ ID entails the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts. So material substances, including Paul as a composite, are composed of constituent 
elements, but not identical to the collection of those elements –or else, incremental change over 
time would entail a brand new material substance at every moment, which is absurd.89 The 
defenders of Stump/Aquinas have all separately identified Baker’s Constitution view as friendly 
to the cause.90 Baker’s most notable point seems to be ‘constitution’ should be another sense of 
‘is’ alongside ‘predication’ and ‘identity’.91 These concerns are at the heart of Plantinga’s RA, 
and are the reason his argument is effective.  
Aquinas himself fully affirms C ≠ ID. The matter constituting Paul’s body can change 
over time without changing Paul’s numerical identity, if his substantial form remains consistent:  
Moreover, the things that are combined with one another do not themselves, 
having been combined, remain actually, but only virtually; for, were they to 
remain actually, it would be not a mixture, but only a collection; that is why a 
body constituted by a mixture of elements is none of these elements.92  
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Hence the Philosopher says that, since one kind of composite is constituted of 
something in this way “as a whole” –i.e., the whole is one– and not in the way in 
which a heap of stones is one but as a syllable is one (without qualification), in all 
such cases the composite must not be identical with its components, as a syllable 
is not its letters; for this syllable ba is not the same as these two letters b and a, 
nor is flesh the same as fire and earth.93 
 
In this way, a soul would be sufficient as the identity condition for Paul over time, without being 
fully human. Paul’s resurrection body need not be numerically identical at the atomic level with 
his pre-resurrection body, since (given RA) not even his pre-resurrection body could meet such 
stringent qualifications for numerical identity. Plantinga shows this by considering how often 
and casually the atoms making up all of the cells in our bodies are completely replaced.94 To 
come full circle: if RA and C ≠ ID are true on the microscopic level, and true concerning hands 
and integral parts, then it is also true of metaphysical parts (body and substantial form/soul).  
So, Stump argues that due to both the Replacement Argument (RA) and ‘constitution is not 
identity’, having a body is absolutely not essential to Paul’s identity continuing over time:95  
1) According to the Aquinas’s Aristotelian metaphysics, a thing which gains or loses 
an accidental form undergoes change while remaining one and the same thing.  
 
2) According to ‘constitution is not identity’, a particular substance survives even the 
loss of some of its metaphysical constituents, provided that the remaining constituents 
can exist on their own and are sufficient for the existence of the substance.  
 
3) Aquinas thinks that a human being can exist without being in the normal condition 
in this way because what constitutes a human being is not the same as that to which a 
human being is identical.  
 
4) Therefore, since a) what makes Socrates this individual substance is the individual 
substantial form which configures him, and b) since the substantial form can exist 
independently of the body, then c) the existence of the substantial form separate from 
the body is sufficient for the existence of the person whose substantial form it is. 
                                                 
   
93
 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 551 (1674). See Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.17.6 (1041b11-
19). Cited by Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly,” 165, footnote 24; and Aquinas, 50. 
 
   
94
 See Plantinga, “Materialism and Christian Belief,” 104, footnote 12, where he cites a figure that even the atoms 
that make up the brain seem to be replaced every two months. 
 
   
95
 The following points are all direct (or nearly direct) quotes from Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly,” 165-6. 
31 
This shows clearly how RA and C ≠ ID go hand-in-hand: in the same way Paul survives 
the loss of his integral parts (like a hand), Paul can survive the loss of even the metaphysical part 
of his whole body, because the substantial form of his body (the soul) is able to independently 
exist as a hoc aliquid. Eberl says, “Soul and body, on the other hand, can be understood as 
metaphysical parts that do not exist without composing a human being.”96 RA merely says 
material continuity is not required for Paul’s NID. But RA and C ≠ ID show Paul’s subsisting 
soul is all that is metaphysically necessary, though not natural, for his NID. Thus, Stump says: 
A human person is not identical to his soul; rather, a human person is identical to 
a particular in the species rational animal. A particular of that sort is normally, 
naturally, constituted of an array of bodily parts and is composed of form and 
matter. Because constitution is not identity for Aquinas, however, a particular can 
exist with less than the normal, natural compliment of constituents. It can, for 
example, exist when it is constituted only by one of its main metaphysical parts, 
namely the soul. And so although a person is not identical to his soul, the 
existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of a person.97 
 
 
II. The Data Backup Analogy 
The trouble is how to paint a conceptual picture of this disembodied state (the separated 
configured configurer) that makes sense. Plantinga floats a helpful kernel of an idea our way, one 
that has been passed around somewhat. “Not strictly relevant, but of interest: could I perhaps be 
a computer (hardware), a computer made of flesh and blood? There are three possibilities here: I 
might be the hardware, I might be the program, and I might be the mereological sum of the 
hardware and the program.”98 When coupled with the possibility –in the midst of his 
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macroscopic RA– that both the configured configurer and the computational or functional state 
of the mind are transferred, we get something interesting, but initially vague.  
Fortunately, John Polkinghorne fleshes out these intuitions a bit more, by saying, “In a 
very crude image, one might say that the soul is the software running on the hardware of the 
body.”99  He admits first the concept of ‘soul’ is still “indispensible for the credible articulation 
of Christian hope, but its content requires reexamination in the light of contemporary 
understanding of human nature.”100 He recognizes RA for what it is: the criterion for personal 
identity cannot be our bodies, for “Materially, we are in a state of flux”;101 Polkinghorne thus 
suggests we “understand the soul as being the almost infinitely complex, dynamic, information-
bearing pattern in which the matter of our bodies at any one time is organized.”102 To him, from 
the theological side of things, it is coherent to say God will perfectly preserve in memory each 
individual person’s information-bearing pattern, and then re-embody them all in the eschaton.103 
Baker gives credence to Polkinghorne’s view, combining it with two other similar views, 
the “memory criterion” and the “soul-as-software view.”104 She points out that all of them need 
to overcome the problem of duplication of such information to retain unique personal identity 
(which I will address in the next chapter), and of course recommends her Constitution view be 
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included for them to be metaphysically successful. Stump/Aquinas upholds C ≠ ID: so far, so 
good. This means Plantinga, Polkinghorne and Baker all share an intuition about this possible 
information-backup model, and the missing pieces can come together in the Stump/Aquinas 
disembodied state. Beyond C ≠ ID, formal causation is affirmed, which seems to be a 
requirement, as well, as Polkinghorne notes: 
You will recognize that this is an old idea presented in modern dress, for I am 
saying that the soul is the form of the body, a thought that would not have seemed 
strange either to Aristotle or to Thomas Aquinas, though perhaps I wish to think 
more dynamically about it than they would have been inclined to do.105 
 
So, then, I conclude: Paul, properly humanae persona, is the sum of the hardware and the 
program while embodied. Because C ≠ ID, the “data backup” happens along the lines of the 
Stump/Aquinas disembodied state before the resurrection. Paul’s soul subsists as a hoc aliquid, 
but not as a substance. Paul’s soul can be understood to be an ontologically self-extant106 
information-bearing pattern, or configured configurer, that will once again do its job and re-in-
form in the bodily resurrection. Properly understood, it does not make sense to suggest the 
‘program’ is Paul, and likewise his substantial form cannot be his material composite (which 
would not just be his brain, since mental states and rationality are properties of Paul simpliciter). 
But, as attested above, Paul needs a body to be fully Paul, to be the composite single substance 
of Paul. But the pattern of Paul can be perfectly backed up, by God, for the purposes of 
numerical identity into the bodily resurrection: so Paul does not just have a composite, he has his 
composite.107 Here, ‘soul’ refers to the essence of Paul: that which is uniquely, individually him 
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and the seat of his personhood. So, along with the configured configurer, all mental 
contents/νους (memory, knowledge, character, consciousness, personality) are “backed up” like 
data or information. Information is immaterial and abstract by nature, and so satisfies RA.  
This works because, under the unmodified Stump/Aquinas model, “the imposition of the 
configurational state on new matter preserves the identity of the person.”108 The backed up or 
subsisting soul is (and is doing) two things: 1) Retaining a configurational state (or, if you will, a 
blueprint) of the material composite via the configured configurer in order to re-build it in the 
resurrection; 2) Retaining Paul’s intellectual, or rational aspect, or perhaps what could commonly 
be referred to as his psychological identity. If it is the case Paul’s soul is ‘backed up’ in this way, 
then the identity condition is acceptable to answer Plantinga in the affirmative: Paul exists when 
his body does not.109 In the realm of possibility, Paul’s intellect could be extant as a perfect 
neural image or brain-map, to be restored like a data image on a backed up computer hard drive, 
or .iso image110 for an optical disc (thus, “data backup” analogy). But here, the backup of Paul 
also includes the blueprint for exactly how his material composite should be configured.  
 Van Inwagen makes a helpful ontological distinction for processing how this ‘data 
backup’ looks in terms of the disembodied state.111 When we ask of ‘being’, and then place it 
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within the context of ‘human being’, we are coming upon two different shades of ‘exist’. So van 
Inwagen gives us two kinds of existence: concrete and abstract. For him, “there is only one kind 
of concrete object: that which has traditionally been called ‘substance’ or ‘individual thing’. And 
there is only one type of abstract object. I will call this one type ‘relation’.”112 Whereas the 
‘concrete’ existence is active (as substance), ‘abstract’ existence is potential (as relation). Van 
Inwagen balks at calling human persons relations, and concludes “If we exist at all, we’re 
substances.”113 But to borrow van Inwagen’s vocabulary for the sake of clarity, I am disagreeing 
and saying this: for Stump/Aquinas, in the disembodied or intermediate state, the substantial 
form of the human person (the soul) temporarily goes from metaphysically concrete to abstract, 
or from substance to relation. Or from existential to extant. Or from active to potential. Or, to be 
weightier, but also clearer for those who have ears to hear: from µορϕη to εἶδος.  
Given these loaded terms, there is a live question concerning how Paul’s intellective state 
(consciousness included) continues. We can conceive of it as a “deficient” or “unnatural” form 
of existence and cognition. In terms of this disembodied state, van Dyke says, “the soul actually 
has a different mode of cognition that requires divine assistance.”114 In this state, composed only 
of his soul, Paul does not cease being human; the capacities of a rational animal are still extant, 
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but only in potentiality, since such capacities need material organs in-formed by the configured 
configurer to be actualized.115 Paul’s soul awaits the hope of being again the in-former for the 
material composite to which it is naturally inclined. The only thing distinguishing the 
Stump/Aquinas ‘data backup’ from Polkinghorne’s idea is ontological independence. For 
Stump/Aquinas, the soul subsists as an individual thing, rather than just being “preserved in the 
divine memory.”116 Van Dyke makes sense of this, “Although the human soul is not available to 
the natural realm, God still has ‘access’ to the human soul and can restore the human body by 
rejoining the body to its principle of action.”117 Stump notes what is at stake:118 According to 
Aquinas, Paul’s separated soul must contain his active mind, with intellectual faculties Paul had 
in his lifetime, the same will, experiences and passions. So, what is the ontological status of Paul, 
disembodied? Stump says Paul’s soul is clearly a hoc aliquid, a something. But to make it more 
interesting: Aquinas writes in SCG IV 91-92 that Paul’s separated soul is judged for doing what 
Paul did during his life in the body, and afterward resurrected into his body or composite. If the 
soul is not the numerically same person, then who is getting judged? The Stump/Aquinas 
disembodied soul, then, must have restricted cognitive powers and be ontologically distinct as an 
individual thing; cognition and the senses are upheld by divine intervention, in order to retain 
continuity of the person being raised.119 
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In sum, C ≠ ID means RA, and thus the requirement from dualism, is satisfied. The 
disembodied state subsists, and it would look much like the backup of an information-bearing 
pattern as described by Polkinghorne, except that for Stump/Aquinas, the subsisting soul is 
ontologically independent –but still somehow upheld by divine intervention for cognizing. Paul’s 
subsisting soul can count as an identity condition over time for his resurrection self. But, the 
mind-soul/’µορϕη schmorphe’ objection still looms. How do we incorporate the mind into the 
‘data backup’ model of the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state? The functioning of the brain as 
emerging from the material composite could work as long as Paul is embodied. But how do we 
conceive of this switching between states? This calls for the sixth and final statement of the 
Stump/Aquinas model. Since it comes accompanied by some deep metaphysical challenges, it 
demands that the model be modified if it is to succeed. 
 
III. (D ≠ ID) Between the brain and mental states, Dependence is Not Identity 
 
 Plantinga entertains one argument among a few he recognizes for materialism: brain 
localization and dependence of mental states upon material brain states. He says, “It isn’t true at 
all that it makes very little sense to say that activities of the immaterial self or soul are dependent 
in this way on the proper function of the brain. Still, this argument from localization and neural 
dependence is perhaps the strongest of the arguments against dualism.”120 Plantinga sees Nancey 
Murphy, among others, arguing how science identifies certain parts of the brain are responsible 
for rational processes like language, emotion, musical ability, or complex problem solving. 
Indeed there are, he says, countless first-hand experiences of drug use, degenerative neurological 
disorders or other diseases, taking prescriptions to alter brain chemistry, and even getting hit in 
the head to show that the brain certainly has something to do with mental states.  
                                                 
   
120
 Plantinga, “Materialism and Christian Belief,” 134. 
38 
 In particular, there are a few cases that have become fairly common currency in these 
types of discussions. One is Phineas Gage, a Vermont man who in 1848 suffered and survived an 
accident where a three foot, seven inch long and 1.25 inch diameter tamping rod went straight 
through his frontal lobe (specifically parts of his prefrontal cortexes), and seemingly altered his 
temperament and personality –and not just as a reaction to the accident (for who wouldn’t feel a 
bit different after an accident like that?), but as a result of the destroyed part of the brain.121 
Although the more well-known details surrounding the extent of his character change are 
infamously cloudy and documented sometime after the event, it is at least a rare, clear, and also 
dramatic example of someone’s physical brain so surely having an effect on their mental states. 
Phineas Gage’s historical case seems to point toward brain localization. 
More recently Clive Wearing, a British conductor and musicologist, in 1985 contracted 
herpes simplex encephalitis, a viral infection that normally produces cold sores –but for him, it 
infected and destroyed his left frontal and temporal regions, the parts of the brain partially 
responsible for storing conscious memories.122 He developed severe anterograde amnesia (so he 
cannot form any new short-term memories) and retrograde amnesia. That, alone, for many 
proves mental states’ dependence upon the brain. What is more intriguing is what he can do: 
Wearing’s procedural memory is apparently unaffected. He can still read and play music with the 
same rehearsed dramatic force and brilliant interpretation as he could before the illness.123 The 
hypothesis is that one part of the brain controls the sort of memory utilized in performance and 
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rote memorization of music and all of its intricacies, and a different part seems to control 
personality and other aspects. Wearing and his damaged brain seem to be living proof of brain 
localization, and perhaps Murphy’s nonreductive physicalist model and others like it. 
From the materialist point of view, here is the underlying challenge: does localization and 
dependence of the brain by behavioral and personality traits and other mental states make the 
immaterial soul an unnecessary concept? In stride, Plantinga’s rejoinder to Murphy’s, and 
others’, arguments from localization is, for him, characteristically pithy: “Does this show or tend 
to show that this mental activity is really an activity of the brain, rather than of something 
distinct from the brain? Hardly. There are many activities that stand in that same or similar 
relation to the brain.”124 By similar reasoning, observes Plantinga, one could say walking, 
speaking, moving your fingers, breathing, and digesting are also functions of the brain, since 
they all depend upon proper function of the brain (although the parallel organ for mental states is 
not so apparent, as Aquinas himself says in QDA 1 and 2). This is where he introduces D ≠ ID:  
The point, obviously, is that dependence is one thing, identity quite another. 
Appropriate brain activity is a necessary condition for mental activity; it simply 
doesn’t follow that the latter just is the former…We know all sorts of cases of 
activities A that depend upon activities B but are not identical with them. Why 
should we think differently in this case?125  
 
Stated in this way, D ≠ ID is basically C ≠ ID but related to mental kinds –i.e. just as Paul’s 
material composite is constituted by, but not identical to, his body, so too Paul’s mental states are 
dependent upon (perhaps even materially and efficiently caused), but not identical to, his brain 
states. Consider D ≠ ID to be the metaphysical cousin of C ≠ ID, just pointed at νους.  
Murphy has taken the mantle of the materialist/physicalist position, going so far as to say, 
after mention of Phineas Gage’s case, "In short, what [Aquinas] described as the 'appetite for the 
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good' appears to depend directly on localizable brain functions."126 She argues that the mind is 
dependent upon the brain, which is enough to make Aquinas’s concept of the soul obsolete. Her 
view of the contest between dualism and physicalism is a novel one: each is not merely “a 
philosophical thesis but as the ‘hard core’ of a scientific research program…based on the 
philosophy of science of Emre Lakatos, who argued that research programs in science are unified 
by metaphysical theses about the essential nature of the subject matter under investigation.”127 
Riding the momentum of invoking Lakatos, she believes “a philosophical case for mind-body 
dualism (or body-soul dualism) is in fact hopeless.”128 Murphy wants to show how we ought to 
operate upon a contemporary scientific paradigm, or research program, whereby mental states 
are, in contrast to D ≠ ID, dependent upon and identical to their requisite brain states.129 
Beyond that, her presuppositions leading into her treatment of Aquinas deserve attention. 
Murphy categorically breaks down mental characteristics from neuroscience that Aquinas 
historically relegated to the soul, to make a case for Aquinas’s obsolescence.130 But given the 
Stump/Aquinas Aristotelian causality discussed above, what Murphy intends as a critique of 
Aquinas’s medieval view can actually be inverted into support for Stump’s interpretation –even 
the exact words could be read in a different tone and this inversion could be expressed. Causality 
shows how baseless Murphy’s strategy is given the distinction between the in-forming soul being 
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the formal cause of the material body’s processes, while the organs it in-forms (including the 
brain) are the efficient cause of those processes. With this formal-efficient causal relationship in 
mind, it is possible to carefully balance D ≠ ID from Stump/Aquinas and still acquiesce with the 
findings of modern neuroscience. But Murphy’s point of view holds her back, and is precisely of 
the sort Stump anticipates and attempts to dissolve by comparing physicalism/materialism 
alongside Aquinas, when she says:  
At this point it might occur to someone to suppose that it can hardly be surprising 
that Aquinas’s account of the soul is not readily assimilable to either dualism or 
physicalism; the difficulty in categorizing Aquinas, such a person might think, 
stems from trying to insert a peculiarly medieval theory into the contemporary 
discussion, where it simply will not fit. But I think this is a mistaken attitude.131 
 
Stump actually offers up the possibility that Aquinas could be construed as a materialist with a 
metaphysical reason for rejecting reductionism. Though he would not say the mind is identical to 
the brain, Stump says “for Aquinas the mind is immaterial but implemented (in its natural 
condition) in matter.”132 So Aquinas’s view of the soul can be successfully held alongside 
materialism’s understanding of the brain as the locus on mental activity, due to D ≠ ID. It seems, 
then, Murphy’s view that Aquinas’s understanding of the soul is incompatible with her own 
nonreductive physicalism is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. If we introduce Stump’s 
interpretation of Aquinas, above, many of Murphy’s observations can be assimilated. Besides 
Stump and her supporters, Baker,133 Hasker,134 Corcoran,135 Zimmerman,136 and Plantinga137 all 
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admit, after close readings, that Aquinas’s human persons work with materialist anthropology. 
Why, then, would Murphy dismiss Aquinas? Are these philosophers wrong and Murphy right? 
Not likely. Derek Jefferys argues against Murphy concerning her treatment of Aquinas, 
and lack of adequate conception of metaphysical causation to support her proposed downward 
causation model, among other issues.138 Murphy responds, since Aquinas is ancient/medieval his 
terminology and his Aristotelian metaphysical research program ought to be replaced by 
something more relevant to current scientific anthropology. She uses Lakatos as support, citing 
“incommensurability” between the two systems.139 Jefferys thinks this is an inadequate response:  
Throughout American and European philosophy departments, philosophers are 
rediscovering Thomas and Aristotle. Martha Nussbaum, John Finnis, John 
Haldane, Alasdair MacIntyre, Leon Kass, and many others are reviving 
Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts, applying them to ethics, the philosophy of 
mind, and the philosophy of science. They have no difficulty understanding the 
philosophical grammar of Thomas and Aristotle, and combine it with 
contemporary philosophy and science in fascinating ways.140 
 
To follow Jefferys’s lead, before Murphy can play her Kuhn/Lakatos card141 and contextualize 
the debate away, she ought to read more of the available literature on Aquinas (perhaps even 
Stump’s work, whom Murphy never cites).  The end result of allowing equal footing to 
Aristotelian metaphysics has been shown to be quite helpful to some contemporary studies.  For 
Stump, asserting Aquinas’s possible compatibility with modern neuroscience is yet another 
example of this, one that should not be so quickly ignored. 
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V. Stump/Aquinas, D ≠ ID, νους, and the Data Backup 
From Murphy, we must heed the fact that brain imaging and modern neuroscience shows 
that the physical brain at least plays a role in attributes that were previously relegated only to the 
immaterial soul. So the task, now, is to show first how Aquinas supports D ≠ ID, and second 
show how the Stump/Aquinas model accommodates what we can say regarding the way mental 
states depend on the brain. Of course, Aquinas is not a materialist in the overarching 
metaphysical sense of the term:142 recall that God is a person by Boethius’s definition and is a 
µορϕη that does not in-form ὕλη because He is pure act. Humans are corporeal and spiritual in 
substance, whose substantial forms (souls) can subsist apart from the ὕλη they would properly 
in-form in their single-substance composite. Aquinas, then, matches Plantinga’s sentiment, when 
he says in SCG Book II: “intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and although they [that is, 
intellectual natures] exist in matter, their being does not depend on matter.”143  
So, right away, we have a contemporary axiom (D ≠ ID) with a medieval analogue. What 
we also have is an admission that intellectual natures “exist in matter.” This is exactly why 
Stump says, for Aquinas, “mental states will be implemented in matter,” and his account of the 
soul, then, is “compatible with supposing that mental states are implemented in neural stuff.”144 
This is a significant assertion we can build upon, and is at the heart of the idea of substance-
emergence that Hasker found so very promising with Stump’s model: 
I close this chapter by referring to yet another saying of Stump’s that I find 
puzzling, yet also full of promise…What intrigues me in this is the suggestion that 
Aquinas might have thought that ‘the mind emerges from the functioning of the 
brain.’ [Stump, “Non-Cartesian,” 520] What does Stump mean by this? Clearly, 
the historical Aquinas would not have thought this, given his doctrine of the 
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special creation of individual souls –a doctrine which Stump refers to several 
times. Does she mean that he should have thought this way, and perhaps would 
have done so had more scientific knowledge been available to him? Or is the 
notion of emergence here to be understood in some way that is compatible with 
Aquinas’s creationism?145 
 
It is correct to say that Stump affirms Hasker’s premonition. If Aquinas had more scientific 
knowledge, his understanding of the relationship of mind to the brain, and therefore his 
understanding of the soul, may have been more nuanced. (Furthermore, I intend to show in the 
next chapter that the added contemporary knowledge of DNA has a similar helpful effect toward 
interpreting and applying Aquinas’s view of the soul.) Note also that this important assertion, 
“the mind emerges from the functioning of the brain,” is why Swinburne is correct to say 
Aquinas does not recognize the category of “soul stuff.”146 It is because for Aquinas, and thus the 
Stump/Aquinas model, while the material composite is functioning (and the soul is not 
disembodied), it is “brain stuff” or “neural stuff” doing the work –an insight from which 
Murphy’s reading of Aquinas could benefit. And, again contrary to Swinburne, Stump assuages 
what Plantinga had also been skeptical of, “The immateriality of the soul is [for Aquinas] a direct 
consequence of his view of soul as a form.”147 In other words: the Aristotelian framework in-
forming the material composite makes the immaterial soul a reality. But how? Again, think of 
the human soul, the amphibious configured configurer, as the formal, but not efficient, cause of 
mental states and other casual connections, which are then only immaterial when unnaturally 
‘backed up’ in the disembodied state. In other words, “the various parts of the body are 
configured by [the soul] in differing ways.”148 It makes the whole thing possible by in-forming 
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the materials from which mental states emerge –but the soul is not a wispy spirit-form that does 
the thinking while the brain is the material foundation for the soul’s activity. Thus, Stump says:  
…Aquinas thinks that there is something misleading about attributing cognitive 
functions just to the soul itself. Rather, even such higher cognitive functions as 
understanding are to be attributed to the whole material composite that is the 
human being.149  
 
This is reinforced by Aquinas himself in SCG II.50: “if an intelligent substance is composed of 
matter and form, understanding will be of the composite itself.”150 While the point of SCG II.50 
is actually to show intelligent substances are not composed of matter, this is to uphold the 
consistency of Boethius’s definition of ‘person’, which must of course also include God and 
angels. However, this specific part makes clear that, for human persons, their intellect, if from 
the composite, will be of the composite. This is how Stump can get away with saying things like, 
“If we can understand the intellective part of the human soul as roughly equivalent to the mind, 
then for Aquinas the mind is immaterial but implemented (in its natural condition) in matter.”151 
She clearly distinguishes parts of the soul, i.e. “intellective part,” because Stump recognizes the 
‘configured configurer’ which in-forms the material composite must be somehow different from 
the intellective mind or νους. 
 We should be keeping in sight what Murphy and others bring up in regards to localization 
and the dependence of mental states upon the brain. The Stump/Aquinas model, in terms of the 
intellect, holds the human soul is the formal, not efficient, cause of mental states and other casual 
connections, and the soul is immaterial only unnaturally in the disembodied state. The capacities 
and activities of the soul, including intellect, are in this way realized through the material organs 
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of the in-formed composite. The five senses, for example, are properties of the material 
composite, and require the proper organs (eyes, ears, nose, and so forth) to operate. The brain 
and nervous system, then, are the efficient cause for mental states and likewise require a body.152 
The soul, as ‘configured configurer’, is the formal cause for all of this. Thus, “On Aquinas’s 
account, there is no efficient causal interaction between the soul and the matter it informs, and all 
cognitive functions can be implemented in the body.”153 These capacities, mental states included, 
are properly attributed to the composite of Paul, not to his parts –including the brain. 
However, as stated earlier, given what Aquinas says about the separated soul in the 
disembodied state, he would affirm the apparent dependence of mental states upon the brain, but 
not think that the mind is identical to the brain if he had known enough neuroscience today. 
Ergo, D ≠ ID. If mental states are dependent upon, but not identical to brain states in this way, 
then the brain’s configurational state, or neural map, or however we could conceive of it, could 
backed up immaterially as information. Loosely, the disembodied, ‘backed up’ soul can still 
think because of God’s agency in upholding that power.154 To reiterate, this state is of a deficient 
sort. Aquinas says, “although the soul can exist and intellectively cognize when it is separated 
from the body, nonetheless it does not have the perfection of its nature when it is separated from 
the body.”155 So according to Aquinas, while embodied, Paul’s mind is able to be measured by 
brain scans, neurological science, and the like, and is very much like an emergent property akin 
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to Hasker’s model: “material components are combined into something higher-level with a 
particular configuration, a substance will come into being,”156 But in the case of the 
Stump/Aquinas model, the mind does not go away in the disembodied state, either; rather, in the 
bodily resurrection, it is restored to its proper, composite, state. 
 
VI. “Μορϕη Schmorphe” and Mind-Soul Make a Modification Mandatory  
Given C ≠ ID, Stump/Aquinas can affirm RA, and thus the requirement from dualism. 
Given D ≠ ID, Stump/Aquinas avoids the objections raised by dualists against materialists. So, 
we can get the blessing from substance dualists, as well as the useful parts of the different 
materialisms, including the deliverances of the Constitution view and an understanding of mind 
or νους somewhat like an emergent property of the material brain (while embodied). Now that 
these details are worked out, we see that if brain localization is a strong point for materialists, 
then the Stump/Aquinas model can accommodate it in an embodied material composite. When 
we combine all of these elements together: C ≠ ID, D ≠ ID, the immaterial in-form-ation of the 
configured configurer, and the analogy of a data backup of that configuring form, and we add to 
it the information of Paul’s mind or νους, we get a model for individuation of human persons, 
and a model for the continuity of personal NID, preserved for the bodily resurrection. Or do we? 
Our wily and deft interlocutors, after all, have been waiting in the wings. Baker says, “It 
is difficult to see how Aquinas can combine the Aristotelian view that matter individuates with 
his view that the soul is a substantial form that can ‘subsist’ –and experience God– apart from a 
body.”157 Zimmerman likewise says, “What is harder to see is how something capable of playing 
the role of a ‘substantial form’ could come to be able to think after death, while not ‘informing’ 
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any matter.”158 Plantinga puts it this way, “A form, however, at least as far as I can see, is or is 
like a property; and a property, presumably, can’t think. If the soul is a form, therefore, how can 
it be capable of thinking?”159 Van Inwagen makes his case more bluntly than the rest, “wouldn’t 
the union of my body and the form of my body, whatever the form of my body may be, be 
simply my body? And isn’t my body, without qualification, a material substance?”160 Corcoran 
does Stump’s view more justice, but sees the problem of immaterial substances has just been 
pushed back from human-identical souls to configuring forms-as-souls. Incomplete substance 
though they may be, Stump/Aquinas souls still seem to be of some sort of immaterial kind, and 
the resulting disembodied state seems to be incoherent, to Corcoran.161 Hasker, who like 
Corcoran is charitable to the Stump/Aquinas model, similarly finds Stump’s ‘form’ to be 
ambiguous when dealing with a subsisting soul as human intellectual mind, insofar as it is still 
too similar to substance dualism, in his view.162 
 All of these objections reduce into one proviso about the Stump/Aquinas model, ‘µορϕη 
schmorphe’. All of the above ambiguities surrounding µορϕη center on NID over time for the 
bodily resurrection, whether they are directed toward the question of persistence apart from the 
body (as with Baker, van Inwagen, Corcoran, and Hasker), or more particularly toward 
psychological continuity as NID, and how therefore an immaterial substance can think (as with 
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Zimmerman and Plantinga, and also Baker). So, there are two forks to ‘µορϕη schmorphe’: 1) if 
soul/µορϕη is ambiguous, it cannot properly handle Paul’s disembodied state and also be the 
criterion for his NID over time; 2) if mind/νους is ambiguous, Stump/Aquinas will not be able to 
really discern whether it is immaterial or a property of Paul’s composite. But how does νους 
contain the blueprint to in-form Paul’s material composite? How is a µορϕη blueprint, formal 
causation and all, still the efficient cause for his mental states? If νους belongs to an entity 
distinct from Paul’s body, and the soul as configured configurer is the µορϕη of Paul, then how is 
νους part of his subsisting soul? It seems obvious: for the Stump/Aquinas model, the soul must 
be, somehow, two parts comprising one soul, or µορϕη plus νους. 
Pasnau, in fact, recognizes this dilemma in the midst of identifying the mind-soul 
problem for Aquinas: "there are considerable pressures on an Aristotelian to pull the two [soul 
and intellect] apart. Aquinas is not entitled to assume that facts about the intellect can be 
parlayed into facts about the soul.”163 In ST Ia.q77, Thomas attempts and only lightly gives us 
that split picture of the two jobs of the disembodied soul, as Pasnau also illumines: 
[Aquinas] wants to say that the rational soul is the form of the body, in one 
respect, and not the form of the body, in another respect. As regards its essence, 
the soul precisely is the form or actuality of the body. But intellect, the soul's 
intellective capacity, is neither the form nor the actuality of any body.164 
 
Pasnau says that if Aquinas wants to uphold the soul both as configurational form subsisting 
after death and as immaterial intellect/νους, he must do so while simultaneously showing the 
νους is part of that configuring form, or else ST Ia.q77.a5 is in danger of becoming a circular 
argument: the intellect exists in the soul as its subject, and we know this because the soul is the 
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configuring form of the composite, which is a substance, which is a subject.165 This is exactly 
what Aquinas does back in ST Ia.76.1c, "this principle through which we first intellectively 
cognize, whether it be called intellect or the intellective soul, is the form of the body." Pasnau 
indicates Aquinas’s strategy, here, “is to establish the unity of soul and body by focusing on the 
hardest case, that of intellect. If he can show that intellect and body are unified, then the same 
can be shown, straightaway, for the rest of the soul."166 Here is what this means for us: feasibly, 
if the νους is somehow a property of the in-formed composite, and the µορϕη has a role in 
formally causing and configuring what is necessary for Paul’s νους to develop, and if D ≠ ID is 
enough to show Paul’s νους is not identical to his material composite (or brain states), and if C ≠ 
ID successfully demonstrates Paul can still be Paul while undergoing incremental material 
change over time, then there could be an answer to ‘µορϕη schmorphe’ –albeit an extremely 
complex one. But who said a solution to the individuation of persons would be easy? 
To complicate things even further, concerning Aquinas’s position, Trenton Merricks 
thinks because a composite (Thomistic) dualist denies Paul is identical with his soul (though 
holding the subsisting soul still has mental properties), the Thomistic dualist must say there are 
two objects with Paul’s mental properties, Paul and his soul.167 At least, there, we can argue 
(given C ≠ ID and D ≠ ID) we are still talking about the same numerical person –Paul is just 
‘backed up’ in the disembodied state as a subsistent soul. Same soul, same Paul, just waiting to 
be resurrected. But, even if µορϕη is worked out in the proposed way above (i.e. by splitting the 
rational soul into µορϕη and νους), then concerning the resurrection and individuation of persons 
                                                 
   
165
 Ibid, 163. 
 
   
166
 Ibid, 164. 
 
   
167
 Trenton Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation,” in Persons: Human 
and Divine, Edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford University Press, 2007), 282, footnote 2. 
51 
in general, Merricks might be able to show Stump/Aquinas’s subsisting soul still only seems to 
be an enduring psychological continuity criterion for NID over time. The ambiguity about µορϕη 
just makes the NID problem low-hanging fruit: if material continuity over time is insufficient for 
NID, and psychological continuity (aka the “memory criterion”) is likewise insufficient for the 
NID of persons, then personal NID over time must be a “brute fact” and we ought to be realists 
about it, instead.168 So, given the different versions of ‘µορϕη schmorphe’ (including Merricks’s 
version), we have sincere troubles making C ≠ ID and D ≠ ID work for the Stump/Aquinas 
model to satisfy the criteria for NID over time for the resurrection. It needs a modification: that 
can make sense of the necessary split between µορϕη and νους; that upholds µορϕη as 
configured configurer; that nuances the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state/subsisting soul; that 
shows νους can be implemented in the material composite but not identical to the brain states 
therein. We need that modification, or else Merricks is right: personal NID is just a brute fact. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
The Modification: DNA, and the Resulting Objections 
 
 
 Let us re-cap the argument so far. In chapter two, I argued for the first four points of the 
Stump/Aquinas model: (A) Aristotelian metaphysical causality: soul is hylomorphic form (B) 
Boethius’s definition of person: human persons are metaphysical amphibians; (CC) Configured 
configurer of the material composite is Stump’s ‘soul’; (DDD) Descartes’ dualism is denied. 
Human persons are one composite material substance and not two substances. Aristotle’s four 
causes are at the forefront to think within Aquinas’s metaphysical context about the soul, which 
is “the first principle of life in things that live among us.”169 The most important is formal 
causation (µορϕη), because the Stump/Aquinas human soul, as substantial form, in-forms prime 
matter into the material composite of the human body and the soul-as-form. Boethius’s definition 
of a person (“an individual substance with a rational nature”) means the nature of human beings 
as immaterial minds expressed in a material composite is metaphysically amphibious. The 
human soul, as configured configurer, is unique as the only µορϕη that survives the matter it in-
forms –it subsists. But the disembodied soul only meets the criteria for being a hoc aliquid 
(particular thing) and not the criteria for ‘substance’ for Aquinas.170 So the subsisting, separated 
soul is not a substance as so cautiously crafted by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Stump, and this 
distinguishes the model from substance dualism.  
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In chapter three I argued the Stump/Aquinas model answers Plantinga in the affirmative, 
“Does Paul exist when his body does not?” with ‘(C ≠ ID) For Paul’s disembodied NID, 
Constitution is not Identity’. To give the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state more clarity, I 
introduced the ‘data backup’ analogy via Polkinghorne’s information-bearing pattern. I then 
argued that the ambiguities many identify concerning Stump/Aquinas and the intellect can be 
resolved with ‘(D ≠ ID) Between the brain and mental states, Dependence is Not Identity’. Since 
brain localization is a potential weak spot for dualism but a strong spot for materialism, I argued 
that Stump/Aquinas can include the findings of modern neuroscience (and thus the materialists’ 
big reason for holding their view) with D ≠ ID, and the mind ‘backed up’ along with the 
configured configurer. But, even with these two axioms, some metaphysical challenges highlight 
the Stump/Aquinas model’s confusing Achilles’ heel: the ambiguity of ‘form’ (the ‘µορϕη 
schmorphe’ objection) and its bearing on the problem of NID for the resurrection. It seems the 
Stump/Aquinas soul must be understood somehow as a µορϕη part and a νους part in one 
unqualified soul. But if it still reduces to a psychological continuity model (and if NID models 
based only on psychological continuity do not work), then NID is a brute fact, and 
Stump/Aquinas has nothing worthwhile to offer. 
However, I will argue that it most certainly does have something to offer. My ambitious 
purpose in this chapter is to show DNA can be understood as the contemporary analogue for the 
Stump/Aquinas ‘configured configurer’ of the composite human person. Along with this claim 
comes the hermeneutical charge to read Aquinas differently on soul, and many objections that 
need to be addressed. I hope to show that just as Democritus can be seen as a herald of modern 
atomic theory, so too, we can say Aquinas saw DNA’s day and was glad.   
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I. De Anima, DNA  
 
Aquinas, himself, identified the inadequacy of physical atoms as the criteria for personal 
NID. But instead of saying NID is a brute fact, he offered up a possible solution in SCG 
IV.81.12-13, Aquinas’s primary text on NID and the resurrection. Swinburne elucidates 
Aquinas’s move, and unwittingly sets up the possibility for DNA as the solution. Swinburne 
starts by identifying the antiquity of the NID problem, with the cannibal thought-experiment and 
the resulting question, if matter is what counts for the identity condition, and the matter of many 
persons is now part of the cannibal who ate them, how do we sort out the conflicting matter-
claims for the multiple resurrected bodies that need it? Swinburne says Aquinas starts his answer 
by saying, “if something was materially present in many men, it will rise in him to whose 
perfection it belonged,” or whatever part of the body essential for Paul to be Paul will belong to 
Paul in the bodily resurrection.171 But what part is that, and how do we safeguard from it not 
coming from someone else’s essential matter? Swinburne thinks he has Aquinas in a corner: 
Aquinas goes on to produce an argument that the ‘radical seed’ (i.e. the sperm, 
which according to Aristotle formed the original matter of the embryo) forms the 
minimum essential bodily core around which a man could be rebuilt. But we 
know now, as Aquinas did not, that the sperm does not remain as a unit within the 
organism…The atoms of the original cell are not therefore the most plausible 
candidate for being the part of the body physically necessary for human personal 
identity. Aquinas’s problem remains without modern solution.172 
 
But let us consider what Aquinas is really saying in this section. Back in IV.81.12, just a 
subchapter prior, he says, “it is not with respect to matter that he has the same parts, but with 
respect to his species.”173 Aquinas thinks through the problem of a person materially changing 
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through time as they develop and grow, and by basically reaffirming C ≠ ID,174 comes to the 
conclusion that whatever is the bearer of identity over time, it must not be material. He says: 
In this way, then, this is not a requirement of man’s arising with numerical 
identity: that he should assume again whatever has been in him during the whole 
time of his life; but he need assume from that matter only what suffices to 
complete the quantity due, and that especially must be resumed which was more 
perfectly consistent with the form and species of humanity.175 
 
So, according to Swinburne, Aquinas thinks the identity condition for the resurrection will be an 
essential part, as in ὕλη stuff. But is that what Aquinas is saying? If we think of the essential part 
as a metaphysical part, consistent with his understanding of a subsistent-but-not-substance soul, 
then we may be getting closer to what he intended. As Eberl affirms, “Aquinas asserts that the 
identity of a resurrected human being is ‘made when the same soul is conjoined to the 
numerically same body’.”176 Then, the observation from Aquinas concerning “radical seed” 
makes more sense: “Accordingly, if something was in one man as the radical seed from which he 
was generated, and in another as the superfluity of nourishment, it will rise in him who was 
generated therefrom as from seed.”177 
While Swinburne points out the obvious as far as what we now know about sperm, what 
he is missing is that Aquinas recognizes something important: the criterion for NID over time 
will have something to do with whatever is uniquely tied to Paul as his formal cause of 
generation, in both the beginning of his earthly life and apparently his resurrected one as well. 
The essential part must be a formal cause. Aquinas’s science may be erroneous, but he concluded 
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much from little available scientific observation. Case in point, Swinburne is wrong. There is a 
modern solution. Concerning Aquinas’s “radical seed,” we can understand it as the information 
contained in each individual’s DNA. This is related to what Pasnau calls “the brink of the very 
deepest level of Aquinas’s metaphysics.”178 He calls upon Aquinas’s remarks in Quaestiones 
disputatae de veritate (QDV) 2.7c, “once the proper essence of a singular is cognized, all of its 
singular accidents are cognized.” Pasnau makes one important observation, here: “But from the 
deepest metaphysical perspective, all of my various properties, necessary and accidental, flow 
from my own distinctive essence. Hence God, who understands that essence, understands 
everything about me, past and future.”179 If it is the case that Paul’s unique genome in his DNA 
contains the information of the essence of his material composite, then all of Paul’s various 
properties, necessary and accidental, flow from the distinctive essence contained in the unique 
sequence of his genome. This information in DNA would be the proper essence of the singular of 
Paul, would contain all of his singular essential and accidental properties, and would contain how 
Paul’s material composite is in-formed, past and future. 
It is vital to qualify exactly to what I refer when I say ‘DNA’: I am referring to the 
genome, the immaterial information of one’s genetic code. Because of the matching relationship 
between the four nucleotide bases between Adenine and Thymine (A and T) and Guanine and 
Cytosine (G and C), all of the information of a DNA strand is contained on each side of the 
double helix. This is not only vital for cell division and replication in every living thing, but it is 
also crucial for our understanding of how DNA can be the criteria for personal NID over time for 
the bodily resurrection. Since the completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP), we have had 
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the ability to map out the entirety of human DNA,180 and from that the ability to inexpensively 
map any individual person’s genome.181 For the purposes of constituting an entire genome, all 
that is required are the string of base pairs made up of A, T, G, or C, which is all the data of the 
HGP amounts to. And, because of the way the base pairs are matched, only one half of the pairs 
are needed in order to have the full genome: a string of letters to signify one side of the double-
helix. The full content of a person’s unique polymer of nucleotide base pairs (and therefore the 
blueprint for their particular material composite) is able to be "backed-up" as information, which 
is by nature immaterial and abstract.  
I am not saying “backing up” the data of Paul’s DNA is merely possible; we have done it. 
The HGP is one of the most significant scientific breakthroughs in the last 50 years, and its 
results show that the data of the configurational state of a human composite can be processed, 
synthesized, and possibly even reconstructed. It is possible with our own technology, to an 
extent: we could synthesize the nucleotides, build a genome from the information, make cells 
implanted with the new genome, and then engineer them similar to the process of cloning to 
make embryos. Given painstaking time, we could, right now, take the information of a genome 
and reconstruct it back into the biological substance of DNA. That is what Aquinas’s configured 
configurer is –along with, of course, the miracle of DNA-as-form actualizing the human 
composite one cell division at a time, from embryo to resurrection. What occurs naturally over a 
lifetime happens instantly in the bodily resurrection. DNA is the configurational form, or 
blueprint, of Paul’s material body from his first cell all the way to his resurrected body. It is the 
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only aspect of Paul that holds unique continuity and remains static over his entire existence. 
DNA, as configured configurer, can survive death into the resurrection as data (exactly as the 
HGP has done) in a purely in-form-ation bearing state. In this way, DNA perfectly reflects the 
heart of what it means for Paul to be metaphysically amphibious, given Boethius’s definition of a 
person and Aquinas’s definition of humanae personae. DNA is both immaterial in-form-ation 
and a material, biological substance –the immaterial is expressed in the material. 
Aquinas’s language describing the soul is more than friendly to my hypothesis of the 
immaterial information of DNA as part of the form (the soul) in all living things, particularly 
human beings: “Therefore, the soul’s esse, which is of the composite, remains in itself at the 
dissolution of the body; and, when the body is restored in resurrection, it is returned in the same 
esse that remained in the soul.”182 The form being within the matter, and able to subsist apart 
from it, is perfectly explained when viewed through the illuminating lens of DNA. Stump gives 
us another way to look at it: “In virtue of this one form, a human being exists as an actual being, 
as a material object, as a living thing, as an animal, and as a human being with cognitive 
capacities.”183 DNA brings the Stump/Aquinas model to life, and shows how the model can 
work, given what we know about human nature from contemporary science and the proposed 
‘data backup’ analogy. Understood in the sense of the immaterial data of Paul’s unique genome, 
DNA should be considered as configurational in-form-ation of the material composite, as 
Aristotle and Aquinas’s ‘nutritive soul’, and ‘backed up’ as the data of Stump's 'configured 
configurer' or the subsistent, disembodied human soul. 
In terms of Aquinas’s Aristotelian metaphysical background, DNA gives a clearer picture 
of hylomorphism. For anyone having trouble understanding how a µορϕη or εἶδος (form) could 
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be within a thing, DNA should clear that up, if understood as Aristotle’s nutritive soul. As 
Marjorie Grene points out, this can fill the need for a formal cause within contemporary thought, 
to open doors to a more cohesive metaphysics: “It is, then, precisely the Aristotelian concept of 
form, or some modern analogue thereof, which is lacking in the modern concept of adaptation, or 
better, of the organism as a pure aggregate of adaptive mechanisms;’ and later, “Eidos in this 
context functions in a number of striking respects in the same way as the concept of organization 
(or information) in modern biology.”184 Aristotle identifies form as the actualization of the 
matter, and DNA contains more than just genes for certain traits: it has all of the most specific 
plans for cell division and differentiation in order to configure the entire body. In other words, it 
is a cell-by-cell blueprint to in-form the material composite it is encoded to actualize. I am 
saying that information is what constitutes Aristotle’s ‘nutritive soul’,185 and therefore Aquinas's 
configured configurer for all living material things, including most especially human persons of 
the genus "rational animal." DNA is the formal cause of the material composite. 
When materialized and actualized within the composite, DNA can meet the criteria for all 
four of Aristotle’s causes. Other than formal causation as the configured configurer, it is the 
material cause of Paul’s composite while it is being formed, as each cell physically contains the 
biological substance of the DNA molecule. The resulting composite of Paul is itself the efficient 
cause for the nutritive, sensate, and (for humans) rational capacities, and DNA is the efficient 
cause of the very process of cell division that actualizes each and every cell of the composite. 
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Eberl says, “As configured, a human soul is a subsistent being. Furthermore, it has certain 
specific and individual qualities. By specific qualities, I intend those qualities that are definitive 
of the nature of any human being, for example, having human DNA, sensory organs, organs such 
as a heart and lungs, and a cerebral cortex.”186 Though one can just barely miss the significance 
of DNA,187 for a modified Stump/Aquinas model, it is the formal cause of it all. 
In DNA, Paul’s final causation is also satisfied, by carrying out the teleological process 
toward his final blueprint –which is fully realized in his bodily resurrection. DNA is not just the 
configurational form, but the teleological form of Paul’s physical body, and his bodily 
resurrection is his τελος. Grene sees this sort of τελος as a Judeo-Christian imposition upon 
Aristotle,188 one to which we can fully admit Aquinas is guilty as charged. However, she admits: 
A goal, even if it is an Aristotelian telos, not a conscious purpose, must be the 
endpoint of some entity’s becoming. Whose achievement is evolution? Whose 
goal, on an evolutionary scale, is thought?....The concept of telos is intelligible 
and useful, I submit, only with reference to something already in existence.189 
 
Since DNA in our conception is primarily form, it marries µορϕη and τελος, in the exact way 
Aristotle himself suggested.190 How? If human τελος is the bodily resurrected person, then Paul 
in his glorified state is perfected to serve the purpose for which God designed him. If DNA 
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contains the in-form-ation necessary for that teleological vision to be carried out, and in the 
disembodied state, it is ‘backed up’ as εἶδος, then µορϕη/εἶδος and τελος are almost the same 
thing, and we can therefore make better sense of Aristotle’s inference (footnote 190, above). 
There still looms the crucial question of how to resolve ‘µορϕη schmorphe’, since DNA 
is obviously the µορϕη aspect of the soul, but not the νους.  How can the µορϕη and νους be 
properly split and yet still be of the same unitative form of Paul? Furthermore, there is a problem 
of duplication as it relates to the information-bearing pattern or “data backup” analogy.191 Even 
if Paul’s DNA can be copied (and make the type/token distinction irrelevant), you would, at best, 
have a clone of Paul, mental states intact, without preserving NID. Right? 192 Fortunately, there 
are many examples of perfect human genetic clones existing in our world, approximately ten 
million, in fact. They are called identical (or monozygotic) twins. Unfortunately, they pose a 
potential problem for DNA as the sole vehicle for NID over time: how can we distinguish 
essential and accidental properties of NID without it being merely by convention? As a result, we 
still need a criterion of NID, alongside DNA, that can handle both static and dynamic (essential 
and accidental) properties for the bodily resurrection. 
 
II. Duplication: Monozygotic Twins and Seele-νους 
 
Paul's NID cannot be merely his DNA or configured configurer. Here is why: imagine 
Paul has a monozygotic (MZ) twin. Let us call Paul’s twin brother ‘Raul’. Paul and Raul, as MZ 
twins, have 100% identical DNA –they are awesome wonders of God’s creation. Identical twins 
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pose a serious problem to DNA being the only immaterial information to count for the soul. 
When Paul and Raul are bodily resurrected, there is a possibility they will be exactly physically 
identical. If they do indeed have the exact same DNA, and no constraining nature/nurture 
obstacles from this world when we will all be changed in an instant, then it is possible they 
would look exactly the same. A materialist would argue that what individuates Paul and Raul is 
their unique material configuration, including possibly the configuration of the atoms forming 
their brains to give them their respective mental contents. But, given Plantinga's observation that 
material neural connections are not alone sufficient for beliefs or thoughts, and you need to 
assign order to any information for it to make sense (similar to the way our brain assign order to 
written words, which are nothing apart from that process),193 the materialist is left only to appeal 
to immaterial mind to individuate Paul from Raul.  
Here is how that works. What could be said of mental contents can be said about the ‘data 
backup’, and it might help to sort out Paul and Raul. Computer data, like DNA or mental 
contents, is information all by itself: it is a series of zeroes and ones. But that is indecipherable 
from, and so also not identical to, what it actually is written to do, ergo D ≠ ID. Data only meets 
the conditions of its τελος when it is read properly, through computer hardware. But even the 
hardware needs to decipher via a programming language, among other things, to assign order to 
the data. Apart from this potentially being an interesting analogical teleological argument for 
God’s existence, it means there is something immaterial going on to order the data make it what 
it is. The hardware alone is not sufficient to do that. So, for the twins, whatever individuates 
between physically indistinguishable Paul and Raul must be more than their DNA. And, given C 
≠ ID and D ≠ ID, it must also be more than their physical bodies or brains. We are only left with 
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immaterial mental contents, which I will call, for the sake of this thesis only, Seele-νους.194 It is 
the only thing completely individuating Paul from his twin brother Raul. Paul's teleological in-
form-ation, then, as DNA and Seele-νους is sufficient for and not incompatible with the problem 
of psychological continuity as NID over time. If MZ twins have identical DNA, and need Seele-
νους for individuation, then the same would apply for all human persons. This is consistent with 
the Stump/Aquinas model: “Aquinas rejects the view that the soul is only a configurational state 
on the grounds that if the soul were only something such as a harmony, it could not exist on its 
own, and so ‘it would be only a form similar to other material forms.’”195 
DNA and Seele-νους are a package deal for NID and for the resurrection. DNA is the 
formal cause of the “hardware” necessary for Seele-νους to function in and through the body, as 
teleologically designed. Even for Aquinas himself, DNA alone is insufficient. Stump makes it 
clear that, “At death, the soul is replaced with a different, non-animating substantial form. The 
matter of the body is then configured in a substantially different way and so has a form different 
from the one it had before death.”196 If Paul’s soul was merely his DNA, then it leads to 
absurdities. Obviously, even the biological structure of DNA survives death, certainly 
immediately after death. Since there is no observable change in the DNA upon death, the change 
in the substantial form of the human person must come via the intellective aspect: the Seele-νους. 
Again, I do not mean to suggest there are two souls, DNA and Seele-νους, or even that the two 
parts of the unified soul are so clearly distinct. In the same way the intellective soul of the human 
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person, as genus “rational animal” is an amalgam of nutritive, sensitive, and rational soul, so too 
the immaterial information of DNA and Seele-νους is a constituent part of the whole soul. This 
reinforces DNA as what Aristotle and Aquinas term the nutritive soul. Plants have it, but 
obviously plants and animals lack Seele-νους, insofar as they lack rationality unique to humans 
as rational animals. This also reinforces Aquinas in SCG II.76, where he says the agent intellect 
is “part” of the soul. It affirms what he says in SCG II.61.3, “And afterwards in the same chapter, 
Aristotle remarks that ‘certain parts of the soul are separable.’ But these are no other than 
intellective parts. Hence, it remains that these parts are acts of the body.” DNA and Seele-νους is 
the µορϕη/νους “split” of the soul that Pasnau speaks of,197 without separating the agent intellect 
from the soul –it must be a subsisting part of Paul and Raul’s NID into the resurrection. This 
means Seele-νους is a dynamic/accidental criterion for NID. It is anchored to static/essential 
DNA, so we can still have continuing NID over time. This means both Merricks and Baker are 
answered: NID is not a brute fact, and the duplication problem for an information-bearing or 
“memory criterion” model can be avoided.  
 
III. Blueprints, Manuscripts, and Mutations: Objections to DNA 
 
 It should be fairly obvious, then, how the DNA modification handles ‘µορϕη schmorphe’. 
DNA serves as the µορϕη part, and the νους part is likewise the immaterial ‘data backup’ of  
what was dependent upon, but not identical to, the brain while embodied. But what about 
blueprints? Corcoran argues against counting DNA as the sole criteria for personhood, 
specifically as “all the directions for how the embryo will subsequently develop.”198 He says, “it 
is a mistake to reduce personhood to information, which is precisely what a strand of DNA 
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contains.”199 Here, it becomes apparent he is describing the sort of inference entailing a person is 
identical with their DNA and nothing else –a far cry from the role of DNA as the configured 
configurer within a composite as described by Stump/Aquinas. Corcoran even makes a small 
argument for a composite, “Moreover, it is worth noting that a strand of DNA itself possesses no 
potentialities. An organism (or cell), however, may possess various potentialities in virtue of its 
DNA…In the right environment (a cell or organism), it instructs the cell or organism to carry out 
particular functions (e.g. to make certain proteins).”200   
Corcoran is right to reject reducing Paul’s personal NID to the DNA molecule, but it is 
also problematic to disregard it entirely from the equation. As stated above, because DNA is 
unique to each person, and is intimately involved in the process of forming the body, and could 
survive death as information, it should not be so quickly overlooked. Corcoran goes on to say 
“no single organism, let alone a person, exists in the womb just after conception,”201 but this 
seems misguided. There are of course a very great number of single or few-celled organisms in 
the world, and Corcoran himself states an organism or cell could “possess various potentialities 
in virtue of its DNA,” among which, for a fertilized human embryo, no matter how few cells it is 
comprised of, would be the form of human personhood.202 While an embryo with a full genome 
can claim that status, it would seem illogical, then, to count sperm and eggs as persons under the 
same criteria (which Corcoran suggests should follow as a result of any DNA argument). But the 
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latent potentiality of a gamete is not the same sort of potentiality in an actually-dividing group of 
cells with a completed, unique genetic code. Again, this points to the necessity of the composite: 
Paul’s cells, being from a fully grown adult human, could similarly divide with the exact same 
DNA he had when he was a fetus. A sperm cell without a full human genome, however, can 
never by itself divide and grow to be Paul.  
So, Corcoran’s line of reasoning is in doubt, here. To say a ‘blueprint’ is not a thing is an 
oversimplification. DNA is an active, teleological blueprint. A blueprint is mere latent 
information. DNA is active in-form-ation. It carries within it formal causality in a way a 
blueprint or plan does not. When embodied in an embryo, DNA is simultaneously expressing 
formal, material, and efficient causality during cell division. That the teleological plan for this 
individual human being is contained within the information of one cell is one thing: but that it is 
an active process, kick-started, should certainly count for something.203 Finally, Corcoran could 
actually get an answer he seeks: DNA, in the sense of the configured configurer described above, 
clearly resolves the ambiguity he points out in his version of the objection. Combined with the 
‘data backup’ analogy and the admission, above, that a psychological component is necessary (in 
Seele-νους), Stump/Aquinas can provide Thomistic disembodied state that makes sense. 
Van Inwagen, we recall, has this version of ‘µορϕη schmorphe’, “wouldn’t the union of 
my body and the form of my body, whatever the form of my body may be, be simply my body? 
And isn’t my body, without qualification, a material substance?”204 While in a certain way the 
union of body and soul is simply the body, it is more proper to view it as a union of matter and 
form: the form (as DNA) is not the body, but is in the body. In fact, Aquinas says the “soul is in 
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each part of the body,”205 and DNA makes this clear. If DNA is understood as the configured 
configurer, then it turns out van Inwagen’s intuition, and Stump/Aquinas, are both correct –a true 
win-win. In invoking ‘DNA’, I am again not implying the biological structure, but the immaterial 
in-form-ation of a genome. It is possible, for example, to download the original genome 
sequence from the HGP and store it on a very large computer hard drive. It is therefore possible 
to have Paul’s entire human genome printed on a sheet of paper (granted, the paper will be 
thousands of miles long, but this fact still obtains). It is also possible, then, for that information 
to exist abstractly, as pure information, as backed up data, as εἶδος.  
But what about manuscripts? It would seem we have landed right in the middle of van 
Inwagen’s famous thought-experiment in “The Possibility of Resurrection,”206 centered on the 
token/type distinction: an Augustinian autograph manuscript held by monks in AD 457 is 
destroyed by fire. An ‘Aristotelian’207 among the monks claims the manuscript was miraculously 
rematerialized by God in AD 458 and is numerically identical to the original. But of course it is 
qualitatively distinct even if the information, and even the appearance, is exactly the same.208 
Van Inwagen’s point: not even God could reassemble a material object and have it be 
numerically the same, and so the resurrection should be understood in the same way. What 
makes this manuscript objection so interesting for us is, given DNA/in-form-ation, a person 
could even be said to be a manuscript: the line between analogy and reality is blurred.  
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For Aquinas, of course, we do not need reassembly of parts, since he already notes we 
lose/gain cells here on earth and retain our numerical identity there, i.e. C ≠ ID, and he rejects 
reassembly in SCG IV.81.12-13, noted above. Regardless of where the matter comes from, even 
if Paul was never composed of it during his life– it can compose his body due to it being 
informed or configured by his substantial form, or µορϕη, or soul.209 If Paul does not need 
reassembly here on earth to retain his personal NID, then he does not need it for continuity into 
the resurrection, either. This is van Inwagen’s point, and also Aquinas’s. But, Paul does need his 
substantial form that in-forms his resurrection body to be consistent. Which is the configured 
configurer, which is DNA. Stump/Aquinas, modified with DNA, can give us that kind of 
consistent, subsistent, substantial form of Paul. 
One could further press, along the lines of the manuscript objection, that just as there is a 
difference between photocopying a document, or even having the digital representation –or, 
perhaps, a ‘data backup’ of it– so, too, would it be the case for NID and DNA: a copy is not the 
original. But DNA is different, and this is where the analogy breaks down. Backing up the 
information of a genome is not about keeping the autograph original, or even a representation of 
the original, where font, text placement, and format might matter for a manuscript to even be 
qualitatively identical to the original. It is the information contained therein which makes or 
breaks NID for Paul’s DNA. Because DNA is able to replicate itself perfectly through cell 
division over myriad iterations –over a normal lifetime, probably too many to count– what we 
have in DNA is an autograph copy, over and over again. The information contained in the 
physical double helix structure is the manuscript and the autograph. This is a mechanism the 
manuscript objection cannot touch: the information is transmitted, encoded, and then put into 
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action to replicate and make new cells, accurate well over 99.999% of the time. This is a fact for 
DNA, or our bodies, and all living things, would not function.  
If we must admit an informational ‘data backup’ of the genome is not numerically the 
same as the data of the original biological structure, and therefore insufficient for NID criteria for 
the bodily resurrection, then we must also admit every copy of every cell guided by the process 
of DNA replication is numerically different than the original DNA. Of course, the cells and even 
the actual material copies of the nucleotide bases will be numerically distinct from each other, 
but that is not what is at stake. This ‘copy’ objection (note: not van Inwagen’s original, 
autograph objection) rests on whether the esse of the document/information (the type) is 
sufficient for NID, rather than the token thing itself –the actual AD 457 autograph manuscript in 
Augustine’s hand. If the NID of Paul’s DNA rests on being a token and not a type, then cell 
replication creating an exact copy of the information would be worthless. However, because of C 
≠ ID, the replication of qualitatively distinct cells is sufficient to continue the existence of Paul’s 
NID over time. In each cell the DNA structure itself would, of course, be numerically distinct. 
But, the same could not be said of the exact same code if it existed as ‘backed up’ immaterial 
information. It would be metaphysically simple, no others would be like it, and it would be pure 
εἶδος. Therefore, no qualitative distinctions could count against Paul’s ‘backed up’ DNA for NID 
over time. This also means DNA during replication, while actively in-forming the composite, is 
uniquely both type and token. So, van Inwagen’s manuscript objection, and the ‘copy’ objection, 
both fail to set flames to DNA as the criteria for NID over time. We can affirm I Corinthians 15 
v.37 and v.42 right along with van Inwagen;210 the remnant preserved for Paul, the γυµνος 
κόκκος (bare kernel) will be sown perishable and raised imperishable –and it is Paul’s unique 
genome, the information of his DNA. DNA as the vehicle for human teleological in-form-ation 
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can transcend the manuscript or token/type problem: the copies are identical to the originals 
exceedingly better than 99.999% of the time, from first cell to final state, from fertilization to 
glorification. From zygote to Zion.  
But what about mutations? Or cancer? Or other damage to DNA in cells from conditions 
in the environment? What about genetic disorders like Cystic Fibrosis, or Sickle Cell disease, or 
even color blindness? What about conditions like DiGeorge syndrome (a deletion of a small 
piece of chromosome 22), Down syndrome (the presence of all or part of an extra chromosome 
21), Turner syndrome (an only-X sex chromosome karotype), or Klinefelter’s syndrome (XXY 
sex karotype) –disorders where there is a clear malformation of the genotype, and even the 
number and structure of chromosomes, all of which come with serious phenotypical results? 
Could we say, for example, based on what has been said so far, that people with these disorders 
are even essentially human? Let us say Paul has Down syndrome. Could there be an ideal form 
of Paul’s genome awaiting him in the bodily resurrection that would still bear his NID? What 
sort of problems does this pose for divine teleology? 
At least in regards to mutations, DNA can be measured according to its original structure. 
The very idea of a ‘mutation’ infers a perfect original somewhere. If Paul had a melanoma, it is 
quite likely that somewhere in his body there still exists at least one cell with the same genome 
with which he was born. If we did a full-body scan to determine the genetic code in every cell of 
Paul’s body, the vast majority of those cells will have identical DNA. If it were the case that 
everyday activities and mutations damage our DNA irreparably for the purposes of NID into the 
resurrection, then: 1) cells in the body could not repair their own DNA without possibly 
changing the very identity of the person, but cells routinely repair errors and small mutations, 
and 2) the human genome could not have been sequenced, which it was, and will continue to be 
71 
even for individual persons in the future. It is seldom the case every single individual cell of the 
body has damaged or mutated DNA, so mutations and damages should not be a concern. 
Seldom the case, that is: save for the previously mentioned, among many other, genetic 
disorders. But perhaps this isn’t such a damaging objection. Let us say Paul has Cystic Fibrosis 
(CF) and he commits a heinous crime: he knifes someone to death.211 Paul is also a clumsy 
criminal and cuts himself with his own knife in the act, and so leaves many traces of his DNA 
behind in the form of his own blood. Luckily for Paul, the police are somewhat slow, and it takes 
them a long while to catch up to him –enough time for Paul to have partaken in a recently 
developed, total, and miraculous genetic cure of his CF. The police take Paul into custody, and 
take a blood or hair sample to verify his DNA matches the DNA found in the blood at the crime 
scene. Would they still be able to identify Paul genetically as the murderer? Our intuition says 
yes. In fact, due to the volume of genetic material in the human genome, Paul’s DNA would still 
be much over 99.999% identical with his CF self, even if scientists were able to track all of the 
many scattered genes related to the disorder. The same could be said even of the more serious 
karotype-based disorders. If Paul had Down syndrome, he would be identified as Paul without 
the extra chromosome 21. If Paulina had Turner syndrome, she would still be Paulina, because 
the other 45 chromosomes are numerically identical in data to the pre-cure Paulina. Since they 
merely correct corruptions, if cures to genetic diseases do not change the person’s genetic 
structure enough to escape being identified with DNA profiling, then perhaps NID can hold into 
the resurrection even with slightly more dramatic changes to DNA. 
All of the above holds if and only if DNA is static/essential. But if not all of Paul’s DNA 
as originally configured when he was a fetus is essential to Paul, does this mean we pick and 
choose by convention what parts of the genome are essential and what are accidental to personal 
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NID? Is there a Sorites paradox of DNA?212 If Paul’s CF can be cured, then could Paul change 
his genes for something mundane (like eye color) and still be Paul? If genetic disorders and 
diseases are cured in a glorified resurrected body, how is DNA static? How many other so-called 
‘accidental’ properties of Paul can be changed genetically before we could say Paul ceases to be 
Paul? For our last task, we must try to judiciously determine the essential and accidental 
properties of Paul, in order to establish individuation and personal NID into the resurrection. 
 
IV. Phenotypes, Indiscernibility of Identicals, and Individuation 
 
 Stump introduces the helpful distinction that resolves the mess, between substantial and 
accidental forms.213 A substantial form configures prime matter, brings about a hoc aliquid into 
existence that was not already in existence, and affects the kind of change that only results in the 
generation of a thing. A substantial form, according to Aquinas, “presupposes only potentiality to 
existence, i.e. bare matter.”214 But an accidental form configures an already-existing substance 
(and so is, as Aristotle says, like a predicate to a subject), giving a substance a property without 
thereby changing its identity. So, Stump concludes, accidental forms are the “non-essential 
properties of a thing; the addition or removal of an accidental form does not alter the species to 
which the whole belongs or the identity of the whole.” 215 This distinction has broad implications 
for individuation of things, especially human persons. Stump argues: 
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According to the medieval metaphysics Aquinas accepts, any composite 
substance, even an immaterial substance, has accidental forms as well as a 
substantial form, and accidental forms a thing can gain or lose while remaining 
one and the same thing. Now on a commonsensical view of change over time, 
change is a matter of one and the same thing’s having a property at one time 
which it lacks at another time. Medieval metaphysics, including Aquinas’s, beings 
with a commitment to this commonsensical notion of change and then works to 
provide an explanation of something’s remaining numerically one and the same 
through the change. Contemporary metaphysics, by contrast, begins with a 
commitment to the law of the indiscernability of identicals:  
 
(LII) For any x and y, x is identical to y only if x and y have all and only the same 
properties.  
 
On the contemporary commitment to (LII), what needs explaining is change over 
time, and it is often explained in ways which are complicated, if not counter-
intuitive.216 
 
Through a few commonsensical moves, Stump analyzes LII, and affirms something more 
comprehensive, given that for Aquinas, matter is what individuates things: “(AP5) For any 
substances x and y, x is identical to y only if (i) x has all and only the species-specific properties 
that y has, and (ii) x has the property of being constituted by this matter if and only if y has the 
property of being constituted by this very same matter.”217 Because of C ≠ ID, (ii) obviously 
does not apply to Paul, or any human persons. Therefore only (i) applies. Since accidental 
properties (including accidental properties of DNA) are not species-specific (see directly above), 
instead of Stump/Aquinas having a Sorites problem with DNA, it is actually contemporary 
metaphysicians who accept LII that cannot deal well with accidental properties. The best 
example: if (LII) were rigidly held for every property of Paul’s DNA, then the police (if they 
were wise on their analytic philosophy) would be forced to let him go if his CF were cured; he 
would not be identical to his former self! Stump offers AP5 to show how personal NID can 
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survive amid changes from accidental properties. If this more robust understanding of identity 
holds, then Stump/Aquinas has no Sorites problem of DNA, and DNA can be perfected in the 
bodily resurrection of all kinds of diseases, disorders, and mutations without sacrificing what we 
have been after all along: continuity of NID over time.218 
 The missing connection lies in the distinction between substantial/accidental forms and 
the static/dynamic forms in regards to phenotypical differences among genotypes. This is where 
the modified Stump/Aquinas model gets cutting edge. Besides Seele-νους being a bearer of 
accidental or dynamic properties, I submit that recent work on understanding the epigenome219 is 
instructive in understanding the way Aquinas’s concept of ‘accidental form’ works with the 
individuation of human persons beside the static or essential nature of DNA. Though defining 
the epigenome is a contentious thing in genetic science, Adrian Bird proposes a definition which 
supports a more contemporary usage, “the structural adaptation of chromosomal regions so as to 
register, signal or perpetuate altered activity states.”220 Epigenetics can at least explain 
phenotypical distinctions given genotypical similarity: it reflects the environmental effect on 
gene expression, or the “nurture” side of the nature/nurture debate. It is even the case among MZ 
twins that there can be epigenetic distinctions,221 which may help to explain how one twin could 
be taller than the other, or susceptible to disease in a different way, for example. 
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 If we think of the epigenome as the dynamic or accidental form partner to DNA’s static 
or essential/substantial form, then, for one thing, MZ twins may look exactly the same in the 
bodily resurrection. The “nurture” environment being a level playing field, their identical DNA 
could phenotypically express itself the exact same way, because their epigenomes, and thus 
accidental properties, could be reset. If those accidental properties can change at the resurrection, 
it is hard to see why cured genetic disorders could not be treated similarly. Thus, as van Dyke 
points out, when Aquinas says in chapter 7 of De ente et essentia that some accidents “come 
from” the side of matter and others “come from” the side of form,222 the accidental properties 
resulting from the dynamic nature of Seele-νους and the epigenome just might fit.  
If DNA is the matching static or essential form to these dynamic or accidental aspects, we 
can uphold Paul’s NID into the bodily resurrection, and we can finally make sense of 
individuation. Aquinas says “the human soul remains in its own esse when it is separated from 
the body, having an aptitude and natural inclination toward union with the body.”223 Aquinas 
also upholds the distinction Stump makes between substantial and accidental form, and points it 
toward individuation for the resurrection.224 Swinburne’s caveat about Aquinas being unable to 
have souls differ in “soul-stuff”225 also dissolves, since it can be the case that souls, as DNA and 
Seele-νους, can differ greatly in content, in ways much more nuanced than if the soul were only 
νους. Ultimately, for Aquinas, designated matter is the primary individuating principle of human 
persons; it has determinate quantitative dimensions, but there are interminate bounds for that 
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matter.226 DNA is the formal cause of all of this. For the same metaphysical reason Paul is still 
Paul whether standing, sitting, running, losing weight, or losing a hand, or getting poison ivy all 
over his face, or getting 80% covered in second and third degree burns, Paul’s accidental 
properties in his DNA can change and still be Paul in the bodily resurrection. As Aquinas says, 
“Quantitative dimensions are accidents consequent upon corporeity.”227  
To conclude, DNA as a modification to Stump/Aquinas serves to 1) preserve the 
continuity of the physical body by preserving its specific, person-unique plan, 2) retain a 
static/essential aspect of the body in continuity over time, and so partially satisfy what is required 
from the good parts of Christian materialism, 3) make better sense of the ‘configured configurer’ 
of the Stump/Aquinas soul. With Seele-νους, in the midst of the ‘data backup’ we have 1) 
something active and conscious; 2) a seat of Paul’s identity that is more than a mere instruction 
set, but is his dynamic/accidental self; and 3) something that satisfies RA from the introduction. 
But it is ultimately the coupling of DNA and Seele-νους that is most necessary for establishing 
Paul’s complete NID over time. The complete statement of what the soul is under this modified 
Stump/Aquinas model is both DNA (as genome) and Seele-νους backed-up. Coupling them 1) 
avoids duplication problems that Baker points out; 2) solves the mind/soul or ‘µορϕη schmorphe’ 
problem; 3) resolves most of the other similar metaphysical challenges against the model; 4) 
gives us a vision for each individual’s unique divine teleology (both in the DNA and existential 
senses), which is ultimately and completely expressed in the bodily resurrection. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
To get back to the first ‘big question’ from the introduction: the modified Stump/Aquinas 
model is friendly to substance dualism thanks to C ≠ ID and the ‘data backup’ providing an 
affirmative answer to Plantinga’s question, “Can I exist when my body does not?” The model is 
compatible with materialism, as intellect is expressed materially while Paul is embodied (so long 
as D ≠ ID is kept in mind). However, Aristotelian causality is required in order to include DNA 
in any model of personal NID over time for the bodily resurrection. For, if DNA is the criteria 
for NID, dualists and materialists need formal causation (µορϕη). Before they can have µορϕη, 
they need Aristotle’s metaphysical causation –but Aristotle did not hold to a bodily resurrection. 
So, if they want an account of the bodily resurrection and Aristotle as the prerequisite for µορϕη 
and therefore DNA, they need the Stump/Aquinas model, or at least parts of it. This means both 
dualists and materialists, to solve the problem of continuity of NID over time into the 
resurrection, need to shift around a few ontological categories.  
If materialists like Nancey Murphy were to attempt to include DNA without 
Stump/Aquinas, they would need to accommodate immaterial information as a criterion for NID. 
The requirement is that some immaterial piece of the human person survives death- if a 
materialist admits to that at all, they are immediately some form of dualist or another, and would 
thus no longer be materialists. If substance dualists like Richard Swinburne were to attempt to 
include DNA without Stump/Aquinas, they would need to radically alter their metaphysical 
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foundations. Swinburne expertly points out the difference between the way Cartesian dualism 
modifies, or abandons, Aristotle and formal causation, as well as the way Aquinas heavily 
modifies Aristotle. Swinburne suggests substance dualism is the simpler and therefore more 
tenable position. But in order to retain the concept of the hylomorphic relation between 
form/soul and matter/body (in order to have DNA as a configurational teleological, in-form-
ational form), the substance dualists would need to regain the Aristotelian metaphysical causality 
they threw out in favor of the Cartesian one. If substance dualists were to accept that much of 
Aristotle, then how could we say such a system would be appreciably different from the 
Stump/Aquinas model? It seems Derek Jefferys was spot-on:  
Despite what many contemporary thinkers want to believe, post-modernity and 
the rise of modern science have not eliminated the necessity of thinking carefully 
about causality. We cannot evade perennial philosophical questions by alleging 
that they arise only in a particular categorical framework. Anytime we think 
critically about experience, we will have to give some account of the nature of 
causality.228 
 
The ultimate importance of this investigation lies in the hope that a mediating view like 
the Stump/Aquinas model can “trickle down” from academia to the Christian community at-
large. This would foster more informed and fruitful discussion of the bodily resurrection and the 
many theological and ethical issues surrounding it. Thinking through the mind-body problem 
helps to make clear the possible virtues and vices that scientific understanding can offer to 
theological understanding. With hope, the philosophical insights can make a more robust 
awareness of any hermeneutical biases present in the interpretation of Biblical texts relevant to 
the issue of personhood. An informed, balanced position between dualism and materialism, such 
as the Stump/Aquinas model, would also help to solve the painfully apparent conflict between 
Christian philosophers, both dualist and materialist, to seek unity on such an important issue. 
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There are some lingering questions, if the Stump/Aquinas model is to satisfy both dualists 
and materialists. The implications for determinism from this modified Stump/Aquinas model 
should not go ignored. It would be too long of a discussion to address those implications, here. 
But if it is the case, as Psalm 139:13 says, that God himself knits us together in the womb, and if 
God directly brings together Paul’s unique DNA, then God creates people with genetic diseases 
and disorders all for His glory (such as in the case of the man born blind in John 9:1-3) –or else 
God cosmically says “whoops” and must react to something seemingly outside of his purview or 
control, something that cannot be said to be within the realm of interfering with agent causation 
(namely joining a particular egg to a particular sperm). That certainly does not seem to be a free-
willed choice any of us could make; even with in vitro fertilization, there is no telling what sort 
of genome would result from the chosen gametes. Stump/Aquinas also forces us to ask the same 
deterministic question of the teleological processes by which we become who we are 
existentially via Seele-νους. One possibility, as a rejoinder to “time-slice” or memory criteria 
conceptions of personal identity, is to say our real identity is not fully realized until we are 
glorified in the resurrection, and so during this life we can only be said to be “becoming,” and 
then sent either to reward or punishment –truly a profound statement of teleology of persons. 
Ultimately, though God may not determine every step of man, under the possible existential-
teleological implications of Stump/Aquinas, Proverbs 16:9 certainly comes to mind: “The heart 
of man plans his way, but the Lord establishes his steps.” 
There are other outlying implications obviously not addressed, but germane to the 
discussion due to the implications of DNA as a criteria for continuity over time: issues of Jesus 
Christ’s unique human personhood; many more questions concerning the intermediate state; the 
possibility of the arcane theological view of traducianism, whereby the soul is said to be directly 
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inherited from the parents.229 There are the obvious bioethical implications, including one briefly 
touched upon in chapter four: given DNA as active, formally and efficiently causing the material 
composite during cell division, there is ensoulment (and thus human life and personhood) 
starting directly at conception. This is possibly the most compelling reason to make an effort to 
include DNA into any model of philosophical-theological anthropology –other than to show 
DNA and science are not threats to Christian thought or to the soul (but are in fact essential to 
them). All of these implications, and many more unaddressed, are all excellent points of 
discussion that should follow from the issues raised, here.  
What about attributing causal powers to the soul?230 Dualists hold the soul reflects, 
deliberates, remembers, judges, and has intentions. They hold the soul moves the person, filling 
up an insufficient condition for action, up to sufficiency. In short, souls do something. They have 
a principle of activity and movement within them. But if the soul were strictly information, then 
how is it that information has causal power?  
Under this modified Stump/Aquinas model, information has causal powers only when 
placed in the proper context. DNA is just the configurational and teleological plan of the material 
composite. As the ‘data backup’ analogy shows, the code of a program by itself can do nothing. 
It needs the proper devices to output in order to function as intended. The data is still there when 
the computer is off, or even if you were to remove the media from the drive or reader, and even 
further if you were to place it within another computer. But its functionality is fully realized 
when applied appropriately. The same goes with the immaterial information of personhood and 
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the physical body. The Stump/Aquinas soul does have causal powers, they are just kept distinct 
from the soul.231 Eberl puts it this way: 
I am being composed of an organic body that is suitably organized to support my 
activities of living, sensing, moving, and thinking. Most of my activities are 
wholly realized within the organic structure of my body, for example, moving, 
breathing, and seeing. My conscious mental functions, however, are not wholly 
realized within my cerebral cortex; nevertheless, the functioning of my cerebral 
cortex supports them.232 
 
As DNA, the soul has formal causation in configuring the material composite, including the 
brain, into the individuated person that Paul is. Formal causation blurs right into final causation, 
and understood teleologically, this soul definitely does something. Likewise, the Seele-νους has 
causal powers, just not alone: a brain and central nervous system is required, but because of D ≠ 
ID, Seele-νους is not contingent upon the brain for existence. While embodied, Seele-νους is an 
emergent property of the brain, and can be referred to as ‘soul’ with no harm done. While 
disembodied or ‘backed up’, Seele-νους is sustained in existence and kept conscious and 
ontologically distinct by God’s supernatural act. The soul’s cause of the body is formal, but 
efficient causation is in the composite. Causal connections are kept intact, and under the 
modified Stump/Aquinas model, especially as DNA/configured configurer, the soul does a lot. 
 The second ‘big question’ from the introduction seems to be the more important one: 
“Does the Stump/Aquinas model overcome the many metaphysical challenges surrounding 
numerical identity and the bodily resurrection?” I hope, over the course of the previous three 
chapters, in the midst of all of the objections and caveats and possibilities, I have shown the 
answer to this question to be a satisfactory “yes.”  
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In order to better summarize, it seems appropriate to end by witnessing Paul’s death and 
resurrection, as understood by the modified Stump/Aquinas model. Let us say poor Paul has just 
suffered cardiac arrest. His heart has stopped, and soon (if not right away) we could declare him 
to be clinically dead. The material composite of Paul is no longer animated,233 and yet he has not 
ceased to be (he is not an ex-humanae personae). Upon his death, his material body is in-formed 
by a different substantial form, now: DNA no longer being active, and Seele-νους no longer 
being efficiently caused by the brain, the dead body that was once the composite of Paul is no 
longer a human person. Paul’s DNA and Seele-νους, however, has been immaterially ‘backed-
up’. Because of RA, C ≠ ID, and the ramifications they have upon the Stump/Aquinas 
intermediate sate, Paul exists when his body does not. To ask certain interrogative questions of 
Paul’s soul (where, when) is akin to asking the same questions of an idea, or εἶδος, and it won’t 
make any sense. We can, however, ask certain others (who, what, why). Paul is still Paul in this 
state, because of the Seele-νους being backed up (possible because of RA and D ≠ ID). Paul is 
still a person (“an individual substance with a rational nature” according to Boethius), although 
he is not a complete human person, and so is in a deficient state of existence. But, Paul’s 
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existence (both in the purely factual sense and in the existential sense) is upheld by God’s 
supernatural action –for the very purpose of providing continuity of Paul’s personal numerical 
identity over time into the bodily resurrection.  
The real “why” of all of this, though, is Paul’s complete expression, divinely designed, in 
the resurrection. Paul’s DNA (as immaterial data, his backed-up genome) in-forms the new cells 
of his resurrection body, in a way similar to how it in-formed his very first cell as a zygote. It 
could be the case that all of the cells are reconstituted at the same time –as it is by no means 
necessary for Paul’s body to be brought about cell-by-cell in this way. Paul’s body will be 
perfect, in a few senses. It will be in the best possible condition it could be. It will be, as Paul 
says in I Corinthians 15, “imperishable” or “incorruptible.” Paul’s as his Seele-νους, which 
throughout the process of being backed-up was conscious (whether it was instantaneous or if he 
experienced a passage of time) is now properly an emergent property of his material resurrected 
body; his brain is the efficient cause of his Seele-νους, once again. Paul, in this resurrected state, 
is exactly what God created him to be. The limits of imagination cannot begin to describe how 
great and awesome the experience is. The limits of philosophical and theological speculation 
cannot begin to touch the implications for what this all means for Paul’s existential self in the 
Seele-νους –although that is admittedly the most interesting question to ask, perhaps for another 
research project. But, certainly, Paul is embodied, and his numerical identity continues over time. 
He is resurrected. 
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